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6'( Bose Corporation 
v. 
Consumers Union 
Cert to CA 1 
(Davis, Campbell and Bownes) 
Federal/ Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr argues that the CA improperly overturned 
the DC's factual findings. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Petr manufactures the Bose 
901, a loudspeaker system. The Bose 901 is unique in that the 
majority of its speakers are directed away from the listener. By 
bouncir1g the sound off the walls of the room, the Bose 901 attempts 
to create a fuller and more realistic sound. Resp, the publisher of 
Consumer Reports, wrote an article entitled "Loudspeakers," in which 
it evaluated the quality and performance of the Bose 901. The 
article explained the Bose 90l's unique design and stated that the 
design caused the sound to have a more expansive quality than was 
justified. After noting the speaker's expansive effect on 
orchestral works, the article stated, "Worse, individual instruments 
"-'? 
heard through the Bose system seemed to grow to gigantic proportions 
and tended to wander around the room. For instance a violin 
appeared to be 10 feet wide and a piano stretched from wall to 
wall." The article caused Bose to v(ose several customers and 
resulted in a suit by Bose for product disparagement. 
The DC found that the statement that the sounds "tended to 
wander around the room" was both false and disparaging. The experts 
who had conducted the test and written the article had testified 
that while there was some distortion of the sound, the distortion 
was confined to an area within a few feet of the speakers. Thus, 
the description of the sound as wandering about the room was 
impermissible hyperbole. The DC noted that proof that the statement 
was false and disparaging ordinarily would be sufficient to 
establish product disparagement. Because, however, this suit arose 
because of resp's publication, the DC found that it was required to 
consider the suit's impact on resp's First Amendment rights. It 
determined that because Bose was a public figure, New York Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 o.s. 154 (1964), required proof of actual malice. In 
this case, actual malice existed because the expert who wrote the 
article was too intelligent not to know that his words were not an 
accurate description of the limited distortion produced by the Bose 
901. 
The CA reveresed. It did not decide the issue raised by 
resp that the statement was an opinion and therefore not capable of 
being false. Instead, it assumed that the statement was both a 
factual description and false. It noted also that petr conceded 
both that New York Times v. Sullivan applied in this context and 
that the DC properly had concluded that petr was a public figure. 
It found, however, that the DC incorrectly had determined that 
resp's statement had been published with actual knowledge that it 
was false or with reckless disregard for its falsity. In making 
this determination, the CA found that it was not bound by the 
clearly erroneous standard. Relying on Sullivan, supra, at 285, and 
n. 26, it treated this issue as a mixed question of fact and law. 
It noted that resp had been extremely careful in reviewing the 
article and that there was no reason to say that it knew either that 
the description was not accurate or that the wording was imprecise. 
On petn for rehearing, petr argued that the CA had 
considered only whether the editorial board had known that the 
article was false. It should have considered the author's 
knowledge, and any fault on the author's part should be attributed 
to the publisher. The CA denied the petn, stating that it had 
considered the state of mind of both the author and the editorial 
board that reviewed the article. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr argues that the CA improperly 
failed to apply the clearly erroneous standard to the DC's finding 
of actual knowledge. The CA9 has applied the clearly erroneous 
standard in a similar situation. See Cher v. Forum International, 
692 F.2d 634 (CA9 1982). Petr contends that New York Times v. 
Sullivan, which petr relied on for its standard of review, does not 
stand for the proposition that a court is free to ignore Rule 52(a). 
In this case, the CA improperly failed to accept the DC's 
determination that the author's statement that the sound tended to 
wander around the room was not an accurate description of his 
perceptions. 
Resp states that the DC based its determination that the 
statements were false and disparaging on the difference between the 
published phrase, "tended to wander about the room" and the author's 
testimony that the sound "tended to wander about [or along] the 
wall." TheCA properly exercised an independent duty, first 
identified in New York Times v. Sullivan, to undertake an 
independent examination to determine if the difference between these 
two statements established that the published statement had been 
made with actual malice. The CA properly concluded that it did not. 
4. DISCUSSION: The CA's statement that it shou~treat 
the question of malice as a mixed question of law and fact finds 
support in Sullivan, in which the Court expressly undertook an 
independent review of the evidence to determine if there were proof 
of actual malice. There is some tension, however, between this case 
and Cher, supra. In Cher, the CA stated that it had examined the 
record with the special care that is appropriate in First Amendment 
cases, but ultimately applied the clearly erroneous standard to the 
DC's determination that actual malice did not exist. While there is 
some tension between the two cases, the conflict is not pronounced. 
Further, the difference between the published statement and the 
author's testimony here appears so minimal that the DC's -
determination that it was false almost appears clearly erroneous. 
I recommend denial. There is a response. 
04/11/83 Kistler Opin in petn 
Court ................... . ·voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. 
82-1246 







Burger, Ch. J .......... . 
Brennan, J ................... . 
White, J ..................... . 
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 
Blackmun, J ................. . 
Powell, J .................... . 
Rehnquist, J ................. . 
Stevens, J ...... . ................... . 




REV AFF G D 









From: Justice White 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
BOSE ~ CORPORATION v. CONSUMERS 
UNION OF THE UNITED STATES, INC. 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
No. 82-1246. Decided April-, 1983 
JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting: 
Petitioner Bose Corporation is a manufacturer of stereo 
loudspeaker systems. In the May, 1970, issue of Consumer 
Reports, respondent Consumers Union of ~tf, Inc., the United States 
published a review of one of petitioner's products, the Bose 
901 Series I loudspeaker system. Petitioner brought suit for 
damages alleging, among other things, product di~arage- / 
ment. Following extensive discovery ana a 19 day bench • 
trial, the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts determined that at least one statement in the 
review was both disparaging and false. The District Court 
also found that the "actual malice" standard of New York 
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1976), applied to product 
disparagement claims and that petitioner was a "public 
figure." 1 -
-:1tpplying the "actual malice" standard, the District Court 
held that petitioner had "sustained its burden of proving that 
the [respondent] published a false statement of material fact 
with the knowledge that it was false or with reckless disre-
1 The propriety of the District Court's determinations that petitioner 
was a "public figure" and that the "actual malice" standard applied to prod-
uct disparagement suits was not before the Court of Appeals; neitheno:K issue is 
~~~~ presented in the petition for certiorari. In addition, 
because the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court judgment on 
other grounds, it assumed without deciding both that the statement in 
question was a fact rather than an opinion, and that the statement was 
false. The propriety of the District Court's decision on these issues is not 
before the Court. 
2 BOSE CORPORATION v. CONSUMERS UNION 
gard of its truth or falsity." 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1277 (1981). 
The court expressly found that the author of the review knew 
that the article did not accurately describe the performance 
of petitioner's speaker system. Ibid. Respondent sought 
review of the District Court's decision and the Court of Ap-
peals reversed. ~ 
Despite our clear pronouncements that 'Rule 52 broadly 
requires that findings of fact not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous," and that the Rule "does not make exceptions or 
purport to exclude certain categories of factual findings from 
the obligation of a Court of Appeals to accept a district 
court's findings unless clearly erroneous," Pullman-Stand-
ard v. Swint, -- U. S. -- (1982), the Court of Appeals I 
found that it was "not limited to the clearly erroneous stand-
ard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)" in revieWing e is net Court's 
finding that there was actual knowledge of falsity in this case. 
692 F. 2d 189, 195 (1982). After conducting a de novo review 
of the record, the Court of Appeals concluded that it "could 
not find clear and convincing evidence that [respondent] pub-
lished the statement . . . with knowledge that it was 
false .... " !d., at 197. 
Our prior First Amendment cases provide no basis for the / ' 
Court of Appeals' explicit rejection of Rule 52. In New York \ 
Times v. Sullivan,~hat the review to 
which a lower court's decision is subject is the determination 
"whether governing rules of federal law have been properly 
applied to the facts." 376 U. S., at 285 n. 26. See Time, 
Inc. v. Pape, 401 U. S. 279, 284 (1971) ("[t]he only question I 
before us . . . is whether the Court of Appeals correctly ap-
plied the [actual malice] rule to the facts of this case.") 
When an historical fact has been found by a District Court, a 
Court of Appeals must accept that finding unless it is clearly 
erroneous. There is no doubt that actual know lege of falsity 
is an historical fact and is constitutionally sufficient to sup-
port the legal conclusion that a statement has been published 
with "actual malice." 
The Court of Appeals' express rejection of the clearly erro-
neous standard of review for an historical fact cannot be 
BOSE CORPORATION v. CONSUMERS UNION 3 
squared with either our prior First Amendment cases or our 
recent decisions concerning the applicability of Rule 52. Be-
cause I believe that the Court of Appeals has applied the 
wrong standard of review in this case and has purported to 
carve out an exception to the clearly erroneous standard that 
is not warranted by Rule 52 or prior case law, I would grant 
the petition for certiorari in this case, vacate the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals and remand for reconsideration in light 
of Pullman-Standard v. Swint, -- U. S. -- (1982). 
drk 04/21/83 
' . 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Rives 
Re: No. 81-1246, Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union 
The premise underlying Justice White's dissent from denial 
of cert, that a CA must accept a DC's factual findings unless they 
are clearly erroneous, is well-settled. But it is not as clear as 
his dissent suggests that it applies in this case. The CA treated 
the DC's factual finding of actual malice as a mixed question of law 
and fact. It therefore examined whether the basic or historical 
facts found by the DC supported its conclusion that there was actual 
malice. This appears to be the main point with which Justice 
White's dissent takes issue. 
If there were no prior cases on this point, I would be 
inclined to agree with Justice White's determination that actual 
malice is a determination of historic fact. As I read New York 
Times v. Sullivan, 376 u.s. 254, however, it seems to suggest the 
opposite conclusion. In the context of determining whether there 
was actual malice, it noted: 
But [the Seventh Amendment's] ban on reexamination of 
facts does not preclude us from determining whether 
governing rules of federal law have been properly applied 
to the facts. '[T)his Court will review the finding of 
facts by a State court .•• where a conclusion of law as to 
a Federal right and a finding of fact are so intermingled 
as to make it necessary, in order to pass upon the Federal 
question, to analyze the facts."' Id., at 285, n. 26. 
It also stated in text: 
"This Court's duty is not limited to the elaboration of 
constitutional principles; we must also in proper cases 
review the evidence to make certain that those principles 
have been constitutionally applied. • • • [T] he rule is that 
we 'examine for ourselves the statements in issue and the 
circumstances in which they were made to see ••• whether 
they are of a character which the principles of the First 
Amendment ••• protect.'" Id., at 285. 
Sullivan then proceeded to apply a rather searching scrutiny to 
determine whether actual malice had been proved. To me, it seems as 
if Sull1van treated th1s question as if it were a mixed question of 
law and fact. 
While I do not necessarily agree with this treatment, it 
seems that there is sufficient doubt that a GVR in light of Pullman 
Standard v. Swint, ___ u.s. ___ (1982), is not appropriate. This is 
especially so since Pullman Standard expressly reserved the question 
of whether the clearly erroneous standard applied to mixed questions 
of law and fact. 
Finally, this does not seem a good case to grant. The 
author of the article testified that the quality of the sound was 
distorted by the design of the speakers. In describing the 
distortion, he exaggerated its effect. While he knew that the sound 
did not stretch from wall to wall, he used hyperbole to communicate 
in a short-hand way the quality of the sound. It is not clear to me 
that the use of a figure of speech demonstrates actual malice. It 
seems that it would be no different if the author had perceived that 
the Bose speakers had a raspy quality and described them as sounding 
as if they were filled with gravel. Obviously, he would know that 
there was no gravel in the speakers but would have employed a 
metaphor to convey his impression of their sound. Because the 
underlying controversy seems to me relatively minor, I would not 
think this case would merit plenary consideration, nor would I think 
that the law is sufficiently clear to support a GVR in light of 
Pullman Standard. 
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Question Presented 
Whether the clearly erroneous standard applies to appellate 
review of a TC's finding of actual malice in a 1st Amendment 
case. 
. . 
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I . BACKGROUND 
A. Statutes 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) states, in relevant part: "Findings of 
fact shall not be set as ide unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to ,t,._ 
judge of the credibilty of the witnesses." 
B. Facts 
Petr is a maker of loudspeakers. A May 1970 issue of Consumer 
Reports, . a publication owned by resp, ran an article on speakers. 
The article reported on one of petr 's products, the Bose 901. 
The article stated, in part: 
"But after listening to a number of recordings, it be-
came apparent that the panelists could pinpoint the 
location of various instruments much more easily with a 
standard speaker system than with the Bose system. 
Worse, individual instruments heard through the Bose 
system seemed to grow to gigantic proportions and tend-
ed to wander about the room. For instance, a violin 
appeared to be 10 feet wide and a piano stretched from 
wall to wall. With orchestral music, such effects 
seemed inconsequential. But we think they might become 
annoying when listening to soloists.... We think the 
Bose system is so unusual that a prospective buyer must 
listen to it and judge it for himself." 
Apparently, petr lost several customers because of the article. 
(As I understand it, purchasers of high-priced speakers want to 
' . hear the sounds of individual instruments to seem as 1f they are 
coming from only one location. In effect, the listener wants the 
stereo to make him think he is in a concert hall with the various 
instrument arrayed before him. If the sounds of the instruments 
"wander," the sound is less than reali~tic. My tin ears deprive 
~ 
me of the ability to understand this concern.) ~, 
~ 
C. Decisions Below 
After unsuccessful attempts to get resp to retract the arti-
cle and to substantiate its criticism, petr sued resp for product 
disparagement, unfair competition, and violations of the Lanham 
Act. bench trial, the author of the article, / 
Seligson, testified that the "panel" cons is ted of himself and 
another man, Lefkow. The two panelists admitted that the "wan-
dering" of sounds that they heard during the listening tests 
could be pinpointed to only the area directly between the speak-
ers. Seligson testified that when he used the term "about the 
room" he meant "along the wall". Lefkow explained the conclusion 
that some sounds from the speakers "tended to wander about the 
room" as meaning that instrumental sounds moved along "the rear 
wall between the speakers." 
The trial court dismissed the unfair competition and Lanham 
Act claims, but found that the article had disparaged petr by 
~ying that the speakers made sounds wander "about the room." 
~L pv The TC found, however, that petr was ~l public figur~ for purposes 
~..£.-~~ ~f the 1st Amendment. Therefo:::- resp could b~eld liable for 
,.~its statements only if they were made with actual malice. The TC 
noted that "actual malice" is defined as knowledge that the pub-
lished statement is false or reckless disregard of its truth or 
falsity. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 u.s. 254, 268 
{1964). After finding that the author'~ explanation of the "wan-
der about the room" statement was not credible, the TC found that 
the statement "did not accurately describe the effects that he 
and Lefkow had heard during the 'special listening test'." The 
TC also referred to Lefkow' s contradictory explanation of the 
defamatory statement. The TC concluded that the record con-
tained "clear and convincing proof" of actual malice. At the 
damages phase of the trial the TC set the damages and interest 
from the disparagement at about $211,000. 
On appeal, the CAl stated that the TC had some basis for its 
implicit finding that the statements in the article would be read 
as factual assertions rather than opinions. The CAl assumed that 
the statements were factual and false. The CAl approved the TC's ~~~ 
finding that the "wandering about the room" statement was dispar--
aging. " . '\ . The CAl also agreed that petr is a public f1gure regu1r--
ing the application of the New York Times "actual malice" inqui-
ry. The CAl limited its review to the question of whether the 
statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with reck-
less disregard of its truth or falsity. The CAl stated: 
"In performing this review we are not limited to the 
Qlearly errQ_neous standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 (a}; 
instead, .... we must perform a de novo review, independ-
ently exam!n1ng fhe recora to ensure tfiat the district 
court has applied properly the governing constitutional 
law and that the plaintiff has indeed satisfied its 
burden of proof." 692 F. 2d, at 195, citing New York 
Times, 376 U.S., at 285 & n.26 and Time, Inc. v. Pape, 
401 u.s. 279, 284 {1971). 
~ 
~ 
The CAl noted that in conducting its review, it was not in a po- (;{ 
sition to consider the credibility of witnesses. The CAl devoted 
no more discussion to the standard of review. 
Regarding the actual malice standard, the CAl noted that a 
plaintiff must show that the defendant made the disparaging 
statement "with a high degree of awareness of probable falsity" 
or that the defendant"entertained serious doubts as to the truth 
of his publication." The CAl noted that a plaintiff must present 
"clear and convincing" proof of actual malice because of the im-
portance of the rights involved in a 1st Amendment case. The CAl 
stated that its review of the evidence did not support the infer-
t I ' p~ _/ 
ence of actual malice. The CAl noted that resp had used experts '~ 
to conduct tests on petr's speaker and that resp had not deviated _~, 
IL~~-
from its normal editorial procedures. The CAl concluded: "The 
evidence presented merely shows that the words in the article may 
not have described precisely what the two panelists heard during 
the listening test." 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Petitioner's Contentions 
The essence of petr 's argument is that the CAl should have 
employed a clearly erroneous standard in its review of the TC's 
finding of actual malice. Petr submits that the fact that the 
case involves 1st Amendment protections does not alter the re-
quirement that a TC's findings of fact (in this case the finding 
of knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth) can be 
set aside only upon a finding of clear error by the court of ap-
peals. The Court's opinion in New York Times does not alter this 
rule. Petr contends that the CAl's failure to adhere to this 
rule amounted to an unconstitutional taking of petr's property ( 
i.e., the right to seek redress for product disparagement). Petr 
argues that the record indicates that the TC was not clearly 
wrong in its finding of actual malice. 
B. Respondent's Contentions 
Resp argues that the Court held in New York Times that the 
independent appellate review of a TC's findings regarding "actual 
malice" is not only proper but required. Otherwise, the initial 
factfinder would have "unreviewable final authority over funda-
mental First Amendment freedoms." Resp submits that the CAl's 
review in this case was not de novo because the court did not 
redetermine disputed facts or review the credibility of witness-
es. The question of actual malice is a mixed question of law and 
fact, so independent appellate review was proper. 
In any event, the TC's finding was reversible under a clear 
error standard of review, according to resp. The TC weighed the 
testimony of the panelists using an objective standard rather 
than the subjective standard required in lst Amendment cases. 
Finally, resp contends that the TC's finding of actual malice was 
clearly erroneous. 
c. Analysis 
This case boils down to whether a court of appeals is bound 
by the clear error rule in 1st Amendment cases. Despite resp's 
protestations to the contrary, the legal standard used by the TC 
is not subject to attack. As the CAl pointed out, the actual 
malice standard propounded in New York Times applied to this case 
and the TC applied that standard. The TC did not find that the 
reasonable man would have believed the "wandering about the room" 
statement to be untrue. Instead, the TC, after weighing the -credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, found that Seligson 
and Lefkow knew that the speakers did not make sounds that wan-
dered about the room and that Seligson published a statement that 
was inaccurate. In response to Seligson's testimony that he be-
lieved that the "wandering about the room" phrase meant the same 
thing as "wandering along the rear wall," the TC, in effect, held 
that he was lying. The standard used by the TC was subjective, 
not objective as argued by resp. Thus, the narrow question in 
this case is whether the CA~l should have adhered to Rule 52. 
The CAl decision to conduct an independent review of the evi-
dence is understandable. In New York Times, the Court was faced 
with review of a state court's award of libel damages against the 
New York Times for an advertisement it published. The advertise-
ment listed several attrocities perpetrated against black activ-
ists in the South during the early '60s and requested financial 
support for Martin Luther King. The Times's liability was predi-
cated on a presumption under Alabama law of actual malice where 
general damages were proven. The Court stated that such a pre-
sumption was unconstitutional and that the 1st Amendment requires 
a clear and convincing showing of actual malice. The Court went 
on to state: "Since respondent may seek a new trial, we deem that 
considerations of effective judicial administration require us to 
review the evidence in the present record to determine whether it 
could constitutionally support a judgment for respondent." 376 
u.s., at 284-285. Read alone this statement seems to indicate 
that the Court was willing to undertake review of the facts of 
the case only because the facts were so clear that a remand would 
be a waste of time. The Court, however, 
to conduct an independent review of the 
broader grounds: 
explained its decision l 
facts on significantly 
"This Court's duty is not limited to the elaboration of 
!
constitutional principles: we must also in proper cases 
review the evidence to make certain that those princi-
ples have been constitutionally applied. This is such 
a case, particularly since the question is one of al-
leged trespass across 'the line between speech uncondi-
tionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately 
be regulated.' In cases where that line must be drawn, 
the rule is that we 'examine for ourselves the state-
ments~ the c1rcumstances under which they 
were maoe to- see . . . whether they are of a character 
which the principles of the First Amendment, as adopted 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
protect.' We must 'make an independent examination of 
the whole record,' so as to assure ourselves that the 
judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on 
the field of free expression." Id., at 285 (citations 
omitted}. -
The Court noted that the 7th Amendment precludes reexamination of 
facts found by juries, but stated that "[the 7th Amendment's] ban 
on re-examination of facts does not preclude us from determining 
whether governing rules of federal law have been properly applied 
to the facts." Id., at 285 n.26. Justice White seized on this 
7 
J 
language in his dissent from denial of cert that he wrote before 
cert was granted in this case. In that dissent he stated that /J/(IJ 
~ 
New York Times stands for the proposition that a court is not 
~ subject to the clear error rule only in its determination whether ~ 
the TC applied an actual malice standard. Justice White stated ~f--------- ~----~~------------------
that a finding of ~ctual malic~ is a finding of historical fact 
and, therefore, covered by Rule 52. 
~ I do not a~e w~ti~e Whites reading of New York Times. 
~he Court in that case expressly held: "As to the Times, we simi-
~fiv;~y conclude that the facts do not support a finding of actual 
~~lice." at 286. The Court's discussion indicates that the 
AI Ll r reviewed the evidence in the case and reached its own con-
the existence of actual malice. Other cases have 
construed New York Times in the same fashion. In Time, Inc. v. 
Pape, 401 u.s. 279, 284 (1971), the Court cited New York Times as 
authority for its review of the evidence in the case "to deter-
mine whether it could constitutionally support a judgment for the 
plaintiff."! See also Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn. v. 
Bresler, 398 u.s. 6, 11 (1970) ~VRestatement (Second) of Torts 
§580A, comment g (1981). 2Resp cites several courts of appeals' 
~ 
1Justice White's dissent from denial of cert also contains a 
selective quote from the Time, Inc. opinion. He reads that J.9f(GAf 
opinion as only authorizing independent review of evidence to 
determine whether the proper constitutional standard was applied. 
2comment g to §580A states: "The United States Supreme Court ..,()'r""~ 
has on several occasions reviewed the evidence to decide whether ~~ 
the evidence justified a finding of knowledge or reckless 
disregard, and it has not hesitated to hold that the 
constitutional requirement of proof with convincing clarity has 
Footnote continued on next page. 
52-54. 
Although I disagree with Justice White's reading of New York 
Times, I agree with the point of his dissent. In Pullman Stand-
ard v. Swint, 456 u.s. 273 (1982), the Court had occas~ion to 
address the scope of Rule 52. The Court pointed out that Rule 52 
does not distinguish between "ultimate" and "subsidiary" facts. 
...... . 3 ,, 
Id., at 287. The Court stated that whenever a question of pure 
l\ 
fact comes up, the clear error rule aeplies. 
~
As examples of 
questions of pure fact, the Court mentioned cases involving ques-
tions of intent, design, or motive. Id., at 288. -----The question of whether a statement is made with knowledge of ( 
falsity or with a reckless disregard for the truth is just as ) 
much a question of pure fact as the issue of intent. If the mak-
er has the requisite state of mind, actual malice exists. There 
can be no misapplication of the standard, only an incorrect de-
termination of the state of mind. Thus, the question is one of 
fact, rather than a mixed question of fact and law. See id., at 
289. 
Moreover, the trier of fact is particularly suited to decid- ~ 
ing such questions. The most effective way of determining some-
one's knowledge of a subject is to ask him a relevant question 
and observe his demeanor when he answers. His demeanor becomes 
~
~'$C/Il , 
not been met, despite the jury verdict." 
.&jt-''~ 
3The Court expressly did not address the issue of the ~ ~/ 
application of Rule 52 to questions of mixed law and fact. '-
even more important when he is confronted with tangible evidence 
that seemingly contradicts his statements. The TC is in the best 
position to view the evidence and hear the testimony of witness-
es. This is the policy underlying the clear' · error rule. See 
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 u.s. 
844, 855 (1982). 
In addition, independent appellate review of evidence is not ~ 
 
an efficient use of judicial resources. Courts of appeals should 
not have to plough through extensive trial records in order to 
reevaluate factual findings of TCs. The taxing effect of inde-
pendent review is particularly acute in this area. The media has 
a tendency to fight unfavorable verdicts rather than settle 
cases. 
I see no reason for Rule 52 not to apply in 1st Amendment 
cases, particularly where the case does not involve a state 
court's application of the 1st Amendment. As the cases point out 
with great regularity, the 1st Amendment is so important and so 
fragile that extra care must be taken to see that it is not vio-
lated. That is the reason that the Court has imposed the actual 
malice standard in 1st Amendment cases rather than some lesser 
standard. More importantly, the Court requires that actual mal-
ice be shown by clear and convincing proof instead of the prepon-
derance of the evidence standard used in most civil cases. These 
unique characteristics of 1st Amendment jurisprudence reflect the 
Court's feeling that it is more important to allow the publica-
tion of falsities in good faith than to encourage undue caution 
in statements regarding public affairs. See New York Times, 376 
u.s., at 279. Nevertheless, allowing independent review of evi-
dence at each appellate stage confers protections on the 1st 
Amendment that no other constitutional rights enjoy. In addi-
tion, courts of appeal are not foreclosed from review by the 
clear error rule. A court of appeal can set aside a finding of 
fact under Rule 52 if it "is left with the definite and firm con-
viction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. 
United States Gypsum Co., 333 u.s. 364, 395 (1948). In short, I 
think the CAl was wrong. At the same time, I don't know how to 
square my conclusion with the language in New York Times that 
seems to sanction independent review of facts in 1st Amendment 
cases. 4 
Both parties devote substantial portions of their briefs ar-
guing over whether the TC's finding of actual malice was clearly 
erroneous. If the Court decides that the CAl should have used 
the clear error standard, I think the that the case should be 
4one possible way to distinguish New York Times and Time, Inc. 
is the fact that in both cases the lower courts had not applied 
the correct standards to the facts of the case. In New York 
Times, actual malice was presumed. In Time, Inc., the court of 
appeals had interpreted the term "actual malice" too broadly. 
Although the Court in both cases undertook detailed review of the 
evidence and broadly stated that unlimited review is proper in 
1st Amendment cases, the Court could adopt Justice White's view 
that independent review is proper only where the lower courts 
have misapplied legal standards. In such cases it does not make 
sense to defer to the lower courts' factual findings because the 
lower court has made those findings with reference to an 
erroneous standard. Because the lower court has misapplied a 
legal standard, the concomitant factual findings may be flawed as 
well. Thus, I think the Court can reach Justice White's result, 
but it will require more discussion than Justice White gave it in 
his dissent from denial. 
remanded for the CAl to evaluate the evidence under that stand-
ard. Because the CAl reversed the TC o~ · "actual malice" grounds, 
it expressly declined to consider whether the "wander about the 
room" statement was factual and false. A remand would be neces-
sary for the CAl to consider these issues, and it could re-
examine the actual malice finding at that time. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The CAl decision not to use a clear error standard of review 
is supported by language in New York Times. Nevertheless, fail-
ure to apply Rule 52 in 1st Amendment cases does not make sense, 
squanders judicial resources, and conflicts with the Court's 
holding in~llman Standard v. Swint. 5 
5The ACLU has filed an amicus brief, as has a 
name publishers and publishing associations. 
nothing new to the discussion. 
group of 13 big 
The two briefs add 
Memorandu~ 
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Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union 
Re: Reply Brief 
Petr raises an interesting point in its reply brief that is 
not raised in its original brief. In its reply brief, petr 
8 
concedes that New York Times authorize~ an independent review of 
evidence in 1st Amendment cases, but argues that that independent 
review is something less than the de novo review engaged in by 
the CAl. According to petr, New York Times only requires that 
the court of appeals, after a careful review of the evidence: 1) 
determine whether the facts found by the trial court are 
w~ 
sufficient to support the judgment; and 2) determine ~there is 
evidence, which, if believed by the trial court, is sufficient as 
a matter of law to support the findings of fact. In support of 
this proposition petr cites language in New York Times that the 
court of appeals should "review the evidence ••. to determine 
whether it could constitutionally support" the judgment and 
language in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 u.s. 727, 731 (1968) that 
the appellate court should determine whether there is "sufficient 
evidence to permit [a finding of actual malice]." By keying on 
the words "could" and "permit," petr maintains that the standard 
to be used in 1st Amendment cases is merely a strict application 
of the clearly erroneous rule. The appellate court in this case, 
petr maintains, dismissed the trial court's findings of fact 
·'' 
without finding them to be clearly erroneous and substituted its 
' . 
own findings after conducting a de novo review of the evidence. 
Petrsargument suffers from the same weaknesses that Justice 
White's dissent does--it has taken only bits and pieces of the 
Court's opinions in New York Times and St. Amant. When read as a 
whole, those opinions are not as narrowly drawn as petr would 
have you believe. See page 9 of my bench memo. Nevertheless, 
petr's interpretation is similar to the one that I have suggested 
in footnote 4 of my bench memo and is useful in fleshing out that 
thought. 
- ~nber 31, 1983 
BOSE GINA-POW 
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See Rob's bench memo of 10/27 that is entirely 
adequate. This is merely to refresh my recollection. 
Petitioner makes stero~e loudspeakers. Respondent 
publishes "Consumer Reports" that ran a disparaging 
article. The DC, in a bench trial, found that petitioner 
was a "public figure", and therefore that "actual maltce" 
must be shown. The DC concluded that there was "clear and 
convincing proof" of such malice, and awarded damages. 
CAl, relying on language in New York Times and Time, 
Inc. v. Pape, held that the clearly erroneous standard of 
Federal Rule 52(a) does not apply where the malice 
standard of New York Times is applicable. Accordingly, 
CAl reviewed the evidence and found no malice. 
The question presented is whether Rule 52 applies to 
the pure issue of fact whether there was actual malice? 
There certainly is language in New York Times and 
Time, Inc. that supports the New York Times requirement of 
appellate review and inapplicability of Rule 52. But 
'V"iullman "s Standard v. Swint, 456 u.s. 273 (1982), 
clarifies NYT. In Swint we noted that Rule 52 does not 
distinguish between "ultimate" and "subsidiary" facts. 
Id. at 287. (we did not address the application of Rule 
52 to questions of mixed law and facts) . 
Swint concluded that whenever a question of "pure 
fact" is at issue, the clear~ error requirement of Rule 
52 applies. Examples of questions of pure fact 
mentioned in Swint - included intent, design, and motive. 
Id. at 287. 
The issue of malice is a question of one's "state of 
mind". This is as much a question of pure fact as are 
"intent" and "motive". 
There are strong policy reasons, also, for not 
compelling applellate courts to review long records in 
libel cases. In this, for example, the trial lasted 19 
days. 












From: Justice Stevens 
Circulated: _ _ -----l.!.M,_,_A:..:....:R'-1_3_ 19_8_4_ 
Recirculated: _ ____ ___ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-1246 
BOSE CORPORATION, PETITIONER v. CONSUMERS 
UNION OF UNITED STATES, INC. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
[March -, 1984] 
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
An unusual metaphor in a critical review of an unusual 
loudspeaker system gave rise to product disparagement liti-
gation that presents us with a procedural question of first im-
pression: Does Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure prescribe the standard to be applied by the Court of 
Appeals in its review of a District Court's determination that 
a false statement was made with the kind of "actual malice" 
described in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 
279-280 (1964)? 
In the May 1970 issue of its ~e, "Consumer Re-
ports," respondent published a seven-p1rge article evaluating 
tnequality of numerous brands of medium priced loudspeak-
ers. In a boxed-off section occupying most of two pages, re-
spondent commented on "some loudspeakers of special inter-
est," one of which was the Bose 901-an admittedly "unique 
and unconventional" system that had recently been placed on 
the market by petitioner.' After describing the system and 
some of its virtues, and after noting that a listener "could pin-
point the location of various instruments much more easily 
1 In introducing the loudspeaker system to the marketplace, petitioner 
emphasized the unconventional nature of the system and actively solicited 
reviews in numerous publications thereby inviting critical evaluation and 
comment on the unique qualities of the system. 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1273 
(D. Mass. 1981). 
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with a standard speaker than with the Bose system," re-
spondent's article made the following statements: 
"Worse, individual instruments heard through the 
Bose system seemed to grow to gigantic proportions and 
tended to wander about the room. For instance, a vio-
lin appeared to be 10 feet wide and a piano stretched 
from wall to wall. With orchestral music, such effects 
seemed inconsequential. But we think they might be-
come annoying when listening to soloists." Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 2, at 274. 
After stating opinions concerning the overall sound quality, 
the article concluded: "We think the Bose system is so un-
usual that a prospective buyer must listen to it judge it for 
himself. We would suggest delaying so big an investment 
until you were sure the system would please you after the 
novelty value had worn off." I d., at 275. 
Petitioner took exception to numerous statements made in 
the article, and when respondent refused to publish a retrac-
tion, petitioner commenced this product disparagement ac-
tion in the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts. 2 After a protracted period of pretriaL dis-
covery, the District Court denied respondent's motion for 
Suiilrn.ary judgment, 84 F. R. D. 682 (1980), and conducted a 
19-day bench trial on the issue of liability. In its lengthy, 
detailed opml'on -on the merits of the case, 508 F. Supp. 1249 
2 Federal jurisdiction over the product disparagement claim was based 
on diversity of citizenship, 28 U. S. C. § 1332(a)(1). The law of New York 
and Massachusetts , viewed by the parties as in accord in this area, gov-
erned the product disparagement claim. 508 F. Supp. , at 1259 n. 17. The 
District Court held that under the applicable state law, plaintiff had the 
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the state-
ments in issue were false and disparaging, and also had the burden of 
establishing actual damages in order to recover. I d. , at 1259-1260. In ad-
dition to the product disparagement claim, petitioner alleged claims for un-
fair competition and a violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1121. 
The District Court held that neither of those claims had been proven. 508 
F . Supp., at 1277. 
---
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(1981), the District Court ruled in espondent's favor on 
most issues. 3 Most significantly, th District Court ruled 
that the ~i!:ion~r is a "public figure" s that term is defined 
in Gertz v. Robert Wels7i, Inc .', 418 U. S. 323, 342, 345, 
351-352 (1974) for purposes of this c se and therefore the 
First Amendment, as interpreted in ew York Times v. Sul-
livan, supra, 376 U. S., at 279-280 precludes recovery in 
this product disparagement action unless the petitioner 
proved that respondent made a false disparaging statement r 
with "actual malice." ~ 
On th"re~al points, however, the District Court 
agreed with petitioner. First, it found that one sentence in 
3 Petitioner's attack on the article included contentions that it was mis-
leading in referring to two persons as a "panel" and in creating the impres-
sion that evaluations of loudspeaker quality are objective rather than sub-
jective judgments. While the District Court agreed with petitioner on 
these points, it ruled that they did not entitle petitioner to relief. 508 F. 
Supp., at 1260-1262. Petitioner also argued that the overall soun.d quality 
of the Bose 901 should have been rated higher by the reviewers. The Dis-
trict Court rejected this claim, observing that all of the testimony, includ-
ing that of Dr. Bose, revealed that the evaluation of a speaker's "sound 
quality" or "accuracy" is a "subjective matter," and hence in the final analy-
sis is "nothing more than an opinion and, as such, it cannot be proved to be 
true of false." !d., at 1262. The court also found that petitioner had 
failed to prove false a statement recommending use of an amplifier of 50 
watts per channel to achieve the "deepest" bass response with the speak-
ers, observing that the parties had conceded that the power requirements 
of the speakers were readily and objectively ascertainable. !d. , at 
1263-1264. The court also found that petitioner had failed to prove that 
the person primarily responsible for the article was biased by reason of his 
financial interest in eventually marketing a speaker on which he had· ob-
tained a patent. On the other hand, the District Court rejected respond-
ent's argument that there could be no actual malice because respondent 
had no motive to distort the facts; the District Court identified two possible 
reasons for the disparagement, first, the "scant proof" that respondent had 
a "built in bias" against "higher priced products" and second, a suggestion 
in the testimony that respondent resorted to "sarcasm" to boost circula-
tion. !d., at 1275-1276. The District Court did not, however, rely upon 
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D-e~ 
the article contained a "fa!se" statement of "fact" concern-
ing the tendency of the instruments to wander. 4 Based pri-
marily on testimony by the author of the article, the District 
Court found that instruments heard through the speakers 
tended to wander "along the wall," rather than "about the 
room" as reported by respondent. 5 Second, it found that the 
statement was disparaging. Third, it concluded "on the 
basis of proof which it considers clear and convincing, that 
the plaintiff has sustained its burden of proving that the de-
fendant published a false statement of material fact with 
' In its ruling on respondent's motion for summary judgment, the Dis-
trict Court had held that the question whether respondent's panelists "ac-
tually heard instruments grow to gigantic proportions or wander about the 
room is a question of fact, not opinion .... " 84 F. R. D., at 684. In sup-
port of the motion for summary judgment, respondent had submitted an 
affidavit by one of the panelists, Arnold Seligson, stating that the article 
accurately reported what was heard in the tests and "I know what I 
heard," while petitioner had submitted an affidavit by Dr. Bose, who de-
signed the Bose 901, stating in substance that "the phenomenom of wid-
ened and wandering instruments ... is a scientific impossibility." Ibid. 
5 Although at one point the District Court seemed to suggest that the 
instruments, i. e. the sound, did not wander at all, relying on a review in 
another publication stating that "each instrument has its prescribed 
space-and it stays there." 508 F. Supp., at 1268 (emphasis supplied by 
the District Court) (citation omitted), the District Court had previously 
stated that some degree of "movement" of sound between loudspeakers is 
common to all systems and its discussion of liability indicates that respond-
ent could have truthfully reported that the sound tended to wander "along 
the wall," or at least "seemed" to wander along the wall. It is not entirely 
clear that the District Court made a finding of fact as such regarding where 
the sound tended to wander. Indeed; it is not entirely clear that he found 
as a fact that the sound did not wander about the room. Rather, as dis-
cussed more extensively infra, at --, the finding seemed to be that the 
"panel" conducting the test did not subjectively perceive the sound to be 
wandering "about the room," but rather perceived it to be wandering 
"across the room." Just where the sound did "wander," in reality, did not 
appear to be the focus of the decision, though there was conflicting testi-
mony concerning whether it was "scientifically impossible" for sound to 
wander "about" the room, or to "seem" to wander "about" the room. See 
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knowledge that it was false@>with reckless disre ard of its 
tftith'Oi. falsity." 508 F. Supp., at 1277.6 Jud ent was 
entered for petitioner on the product disparagement claim. 7 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
reversed. 692 F. 2d 189 (1982). The court accepted the find-
ing that the comment about wandering instruments was dis-
paraging. It assumed, without deciding, that the statement 
was one of fact, rather than opinion, and that it was false, ob-
serving that "stemming at least in part from the uncertain 
nature of the statement as one of fact or opinion, it is difficult 
to determine with confidence whether it is true or false." 
I d., at 194. After noting that petitiongr did not c.ontesUhe I 
conclusion that it was a public figure, gr the applicability of 
the ew or tmes s andard, the COurt OfA.Ppeals held 
that it~ual malice" determination was not 
6 In its ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the District Court 
assumed, without deciding, that the actual malice standard would be appli-
cable in the case and expressly recognized that falsity alone does not prove 
that statements were made with actual malice, observing that additional 
facts are required, and that there must be clear and convincing evidence on 
this question. 84 F. R. D., at 684-685. In holding that there was a mate-
rial issue of "fact" (a label we use advisedly) on actual malice, the District 
Court recounted petitioner's argument that the panelists must have known 
the statements concerning enlarged and wandering instruments were false 
because they were false, ibid. ("[A]ccording to plaintiff, the panel could not 
have heard these phenomena and the statement that they did hear them 
was false. The plaintiff further contends that because Seligson was a 
member of the listening panel . . . he must have known that the statement 
was false ... . "). The court also noted petitioner's evidence concerning 
Seligison's patent on a speaker system, and indulging in all reasonable in-
ferences favorable to the plaintiff, concluded that a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact existed on the question of actual malice. I d., at 686. 
7 A separate trial before a different judge on the issue of damages re-
sulted in a finding that the false disparaging statement resulted in a sales 
loss of 824 units, each of which would have produced a net profit of $129, 
causing petitioner damages of $106,296. Petitioner also was awarded 
$9,000 for expenses incurred in an attempt to mitigate damages. Judg-
ment for the total amount, plus interest, was entered by the District 
Court. 529 F. Supp. 357 (1981). 
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"limited" to the clearly erroneous stand~··;.,:r.;: in- ..__ 
stead, it stated that it "must perform a((ie novo ~~~e- C /l J - ~ 
pendently examining the record to en'sure-trratthedistrict ~
court has applied properly the governing constitutional law 
and that the plaintiff has indeed satisfied its burden of proof." b ~ 
I d., at 195. It added, however, that it "was in no position to 
consider the credibility of witnesses and must leave such 
questions of demeanor to the trier of fact." Ibid. Based on 
its own review of the record, the Court of Appeals concluded: 
~ 'I ,~ C:ll />--·-1 .. ..11.-.a 
"[W]e are unable to find clear and convincing evidence <..--V~ 
that CU published the statement that indiviclllarinstru-
ments tended to wander about the room with knowledge 
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it 
was false or not. The evidence presented merely shows 
that the words in the article may not have described pre-
cisely what the two panelists heard during the listening 
test. CU was ~ilty of using imprecise Ian age in the 
article-perhaps resultmg from an attempt to produce a 
readable article for its' mass audience. Certainly this 
does not support an inference of actual malice." I d., at 
197. 
We granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of 
Appeals erred when it refused to apply the clearly erroneous 
standard of Rule 52(a) to the District Court's "finding" of ac-
tual malice. -- U. S. -- (1983). 
I 
To place the issue in focus, it is necessary to state in some-
what greater detail (a) the evidence on the "actual malice" 
issue; and (b) the basis for the District Court's determination. 
8Judge Campbell concurred specially to emphasize the fact that the 
Court of Appeals had not passed on the merits of the District Court's hold-
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Evidence of Actual Malice. 
At trial petitioners endeavored to prove that the key sen-
tence embodied three distinct falsehoods about instruments 
heard through the Bose system: (1) that their size seemed 
grossly enlarged; (2) that they seemed to move; and (3) that 
their movement was "about the room." 
Although a great deal of the evidence concerned the first 
two points, the District Court found that neither was false. 
It concluded that the average reader would understand that 
the reference to enlarged instruments was intended to de-
scribe the size of the area from which the sound seemed to 
emanate rather than to any perception about the actual size 
of the musical instruments being played, rejecting as "ab-
surd" the notion that readers would interpret the figurative 
language literally. 508 F. Supp., at 1266.9 After referring to 
testimony explaining "that a certain degree of movement of 
the apparent sound source is to be expected with all stereo 
loudspeaker systems," the District Court recognized that the 
statement was accurate insofar as it reported that "instru-
ments ... tended to wander .... " Id., at 1267. Thus, nei-
ther the reference to the apparent size of the instruments, 
nor the reference to the fact that instruments appeared to 
move, was false. 10 
The statement that instruments tended to wander "about 
the room" was found false because what the listeners in the 
test actually perceived was an apparent movement back and 
forth along the wall in front of them and between the two 
9 "Therefore, the plaintiff did not present any evidence to contradict the 
defendant's evidence which tended to show that when listening to the Bose 
901 a listener could and does perceive that the apparent sound source is 
very large. Thus, the court concludes that the plaintiff has not sustained 
its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's 
statement-'instruments . .. seemed to grow to gigantic proportions'-
was false." 508 F. Supp., at 1267. 
'
0 Thus, respondent prevailed on both of the issues of fact that had been 
identified at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings. See n. 4, 
supra. 
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speakers. Because an apparent movement "about the 
room"-rather than back and forth-would be so different 
from what the average listener has learned to expect, the 
District Court concluded "that the location of the movement 
of the apparent sound source is just as critical to a reader as 
the fact that movement occurred." Ibid. 
The evidence concerning respondent's knowledge of this 
falsity focused on Arnold Seligson, an engineer employed by 
respondent. Seligson supervised the test of the Bose 901 
and prepared the written report upon which the published ar-
ticle was based. His initial in-house report contained this 
sentence: "'Instruments not only could not be placed with 
precision but appeared to suffer from giganticism and a tend-
ency to wander around the room; a violin seemed about 10 ft. 
wide, a piano stretched from wall to wall, etc.'" I d., at 1264, 
n. 28. Since the editorial revision from "around the room" to 
"about' the room" did not change the meaning of the false 
statement, and since there was no evidence that the editors 
were aware of the inaccuracy in the original report, the ac-
tual malice determination rests entirely on an evaluation of 
Seligson's state of mind when he wrote his initial report, or 
when he checked the article against that report. 
' 
Seligson was deposed before trial and testified for almost 
s~day~l itself. At one point in his directexami-
natiOil,he respondeaatfength to technical testimony by Dr. 
Bose, explaining the scientific explanation for the apparent 
movement of the source of sound back and forth across a wall. 
Joint App. 117-122. The trial judge then questioned 
Seligson, and that questioning revealed that the movement 
which Seligson had heard during the tests was confined to the 
wall. 11 During his cross-examination, at counsel's request he 
11 The following questions were asked and answered: 
"Q. Does that explain, in your opinion, the lateral movement of the 
instrument? 
"A. Yes. 
I I ... 
' . 
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drew a rough sketch of the movement of the sound source 
that he intended to describe with the words "tended to wan-
der about the room"; that sketch revealed a back and forth 
movement along the wall between the speakers. He was 
then asked: 
"Q. Mr. Seligson, why did you use the words 'tended 
to wander about the room' to describe what you have 
drawn on the board? 
"A. Well, I don't know what made me pick that par-
ticular choice of words. Would you have been more sat-
isfied if we said 'across,'-! think not-instead of before. 
I have the feeling you would have objected in either 
event. The word 'about' meant just as I drew it on the 
board. Now, I so testified in my deposition"-Joint 
App. 169. 12 
"Q. I think your statement in the article which says they moved into the 
room, just as if they came forward, as well-
" A. The example given for the movement into the room refers only to a 
widened violin and a widened piano and was meant to imply only that the 
widening and movement was across the rear wall from the two speakers. 
"Q. 'It tended to wander about the room.' It didn't say from side to 
side or against the walls alone, but it says-
"A. I believe the next sentence is meant to explain that. It then says, 
'For instance,' as an example of the effect. 
"Q. The word 'about' means around, doesn't it? 
"A. It was, your Honor, it was meant to mean about the rear wall, be-
tween the speakers. 
"Q. That isn't what it says, though. 
"A. I understand." 
Joint App. 122-124 
12 These additional questions were then asked and answered: 
"Q. Would it have been more accurate in your judgment to say that the 
instruments tended to move back and forth between the two speakers? 
"A. No, I don't think so, taken in context of the way it's described. Re-
member, the effect is carefully described in a few sentences later. It's 
hard to mistake. 
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The District Court's Actual Malice Determination. 
The District Court's reasons for fin mg a sity in the de-
scription of the location of the movement of the wandering in-
struments provided the background for its ruling on actual 
malice. The court concluded that "no reasonable reader" 
would understand the sentence as describing lateral move-
ment along the wall. Because the "average reader" would 
interpret the word "about" according to its "plain ordinary 
meaning," the District Court unequivocally rejected 
Seligson's testimony-and respondent's argument-that the 
sentence, when read in context, could be understood to refer 
to lateral movement. 13 
On similar reasoning the District Court found Seligson's 
above-quoted explanation of the intended meaning of the sen-
tence incredible. The District Court reasoned: 
"Thus, according to Seligson, the words used in the 
Article--'About the room'-mean something different to 
him than they do to the populace in general. If Seligson 
"Q. Is there anything in the article which you think conveys to the 
reader the idea that the instruments stayed down at one end of the room 
and didn't come out and wander about, like you wandered about, where 
you have drawn the orange line? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. What is that? 
"A. I would think that the reader would get that from reading that a 
violin appeared to be ten feet wide and a piano stretched from wall to wall. 
This is no hint of depth or whatever, entering into the room." Joint App. 
16~170. 
" The District Court buttressed this conclusion by pointing out that peti-
tioner had received no complaints from purchasers about any wandering 
instruments, and that no other reviews of the Bose 901 had referred to 
wandering instruments. On the contrary, a review quoted by the District 
Court commented that "each instrument has its prescribed space-and it 
stays there." Seen. 5, supra. This evidence, however, was more proba-
tive of falsity in ascribing any movement at all to the sound source than of 
falsity in describing the location of the movement. As we have pointed 
out, the District Court found that the article was truthful insofar as it 
stated that apparent movement occured. 
' ' 
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is to be believed, at the time of publication of the Article 
he interpreted, and he still interprets today, the words 
'about the room' to mean 'along the wall.' After careful 
consideration of Seligson's testimony and of his de-
meanor at trial, the Court finds that Seligson's testimony 
on this point is not credible. Seligson is an intelligent 
person whose knowledge of the English language cannot 
be questioned. It is simply impossible for the Court to 
believe that he interprets a commonplace word such as 
'about' to mean anything other than its plain ordinary 
meaning. 
"Based on the above finding that Seligson's testimony 
to the contrary is not credible, the Court further finds 
that at the time of the Article's publication Seligson 
knew that the words 'individual instruments . . . tended 
to wander about the room' did not accurately describe 
the effects that he and Lefkow had heard during the 
'special listening test.' Consequently, the Court con-
cludes, on the basis of proof which it considers clear and 
convincing, that the plaintiff has sustained its burden of 
proving that the defendant published a false statement of 
material fact with the knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard of its truth or falsity." 508 F. Supp., 
at 127~ 1277. 
Notably, the District Court's ultimate determination of ac-
tual malice was framed as a conclusion and was stated in the 
disjunctive. Even though the District Court found it impos-
sible to believe that Seligson-at the time of trial-was 
truthfully maintaining that the words "about the room" could 
fairly be read, in context, to describe lateral movement 
rather than irregular movement throughout the room, the 
District Court did not identify any independent evidence that 
Seligffian realized the inaccuracYQr the statement, o; enter-
tained serious doubts about its truthfulness, at the time of 
----------------------------
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publication. 14 
II 
This is a case in which two well settled and respected rules 
of law point in oppo~ite directions. 
Petl 10ner correct y remm s us that Rule 52(a) provides: ~ 
"Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly er-  
roneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportu-
tritYQr the trial court to judge of the credibility of the 
witnesses." 
We have repeatedly held that the rule means what it says. 
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. lves Laboratories, Inc., 456 
U. S. 844, 855-856 (1982); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 
U. S. 273, 287 (1982); United States v. United States Gypsum 
Co., 333 U. S. 364, 394-396 (1948). It surely does not 
stretch the language of the rule to characterize an inquiry 
into what a person knew at a given point in time as a question 
of "fact." 15 In this case, since the trial judge expressly com-
mented on Seligson's credibility, petitioner argues that the 
Court of Appeals plainly erred when it refused to uphold the 
District Court's actual malice "finding" under the clearly er-
roneous standard of Rule 52(a). 
On the other hand, respondent correctl~nds us that in 
cases raising First Amendment issues we have repeatedly 
held that anappellate court lias anob!ii2 atfon to ''make an in-
depen en exammation of the w record' in order to make 
sure "that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden in-
trusion on the field of free expression." New York Times v. 
Sullivan, supra, 376 U. S., at 284-286. See also i::rAACP v. 
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U. S. 886, 933-934 (1983); Green-
belt Cooperative Publishing Assn. v. Bressler, 398 U. S. 6, 
14 The District Court expressly rejected petitioner's exhaustive attempt 
to prove that Seligson had a continuing interest in marketing his own 
speaker and therefore deliberately distorted the review. 508 F. Supp., at 
1275. 
16 lndeed, in Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 170 (1979) we referred in 
passing to actual malice as "ultimate fact." 
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11 (1970); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 732-733 
(1968). Although such statements have been made most fre-
quently in cases to which Rule 52(a) does not apply because 
they arose in state courts, respondent argues that the con-
stitutional principle is equally app ca e to e era Itlga 10n. 
We qw e agree; sure y · wou ervert t e concept of feder-
alism for trus Court to lay claim to a broader power of review 
over state court judgments than it exercises in reviewing the 
judgments of intermediate federal courts. 
Our standard of review must be faithful to both Rule 52(a) 
and t e ru e o m epen en review app Ied1n New York 
Times v. ul wan. e con ct etween the two rules is in 
some respects more apparent than real. The New York 
Times rule emphasizes the need for an appellate court to 
make an independent examination of the entire record; Rule 
52(a) never forbids such an examination, and indeed our sem-
inal decision on the rule expressly contemplated a review of 
the entire record, stating that a "finding is 'clearly erroneous' 
when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing 
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed." United 
States v. Gypsum Co., supra, 333 U. S., at 395 (emphasis 
supplied). Moreover, Rule 52(a) commands that "due re-
gard" shall be given to the trial judge's opportunity to ob-
serve the demeanor of the witnesses; the constitutionally-
based rule of indepenaent reVie~rmits this oppo?€umty to 
beg we n its due. Indeed, as we previously observed, the 
Court of Appeals in this case expressly declined to second-
guess the district judge on the credibility of the witnesses. 
The requirement that special deference be given to a trial 
judge's ~r~ihilitL de~1olliis Itself a recogcltion of the 
broader proposition that the presumption of correctness that 
attaches to factual findings is stronger in some cases.....th,an in 
o~s. The same "clearly erroneous"~dard applies to 
findings based on d~umen~de~e as to those based en-
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supra, 333 U. S., at 394, but the presum lion has lesser force 
in the former situation than m the latter. mn arly, the 
st~~trfal becomes longer and 
more complex, but the likelihood that the appellate court will \ 
rely on the presumption tends to increase when trial judges 
have lived with the controversy for weeks or months instead 
of just a few hours. 16 One might therefore assume that the 
cases in which the appellate courts have a duty to exercise 
independent review are merely those in which the presump-
tion that the trial court's ruling is correct is particularly 
weak. The difference between the two rules, however, is 
much more tl.:!.an a mere matter of deS!ee. For the ruleof 
ind~ review assigns to judges a constitutional respon-
sibility that cannot be delegated to the trier of fact, whether 
the factfinding function be performed in the particular case 
by a jury or by a trial judge. 
Rule 52(a) applies to findings of fact, including those de-
scribed as "ultimate facts" because they may determine the 
outcome of litigation. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 
supra, 456 U. S., at 287. But Rule 52(a) does not inhibit an 
appellate court's power to correct errors of law, including 
'
6 "The conclusiveness of a . 'finding of fact' depends on the nature of the 
materials on which ·the finding is based. The finding even of a so-called 
'subsidiary fact' may be a more or less difficult process varying according to 
the simplicity or sublety of the type of 'fact' in controversy. Finding so-
called ultimate 'facts' more clearly implies the application of standards of 
law. And so the 'finding of fact' even if made by two courts may go beyond 
the determination that should not be set aside here. Though labeled 'find-
ing of fact,' it may involve the very basis on which judgment of fallible evi-
dence is to be made. Thus, the conclusion that may appropriately be 
drawn from the whole mass of evidence is not always the ascertainment of 
the kind of 'fact' that precludes consideration by this Court. See, e. g., 
Beyer v. LeFevre, 186 U. S. 114. Particularly is this so where a decision 
here for review cannot escape broadly social judgments-judgments lying 
close to opinion regarding the whole nature of our Government and the du-
ties and immunities of citizenship." Baumgartner v. United States, 322 
U. S. 665, 670-671 (1944). See generally Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 
supra, 456 U. S., at 28~287 n. 16. 
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those that may infect a so-called mixed finding of law and 
fact, or a finding of fact that is predicated on a misunder-
standing of the governing rule of law. See ibid.; Inwood 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., supra, 456 
U. S., at 855 n. 15. Nor does Rule 52(a) "furnish particular 
guidance with respect to distinguishing law from fact." 
Pullman Standard v. Swint, supra, 456 U. S., at 288. 
What we have characterized as "the vexing nature" of that 
distinction, ibid., does not, however, diminish its importance, 
or the importance of the principles that require the distinc-
tion to be drawn in certain cases. 17 
In a consideration of the possible application of the distinc-
tion to the issue of "actual malice" at least three characteris-
tics of the rule enunciated in the New York Times case are 
relevant. First, the common law heritage of the rule itself 
assigns an especially broad role to the judge in a lying it to 
specific factua s1 ua 10 s. econ , t e content of the ru e is 
no~ by its literal text, but rather is given 
meaning through the evolutionary process of common law ad- 7 
judication; though the source of the rule is found in the con- " 
stitution, it is nevertheless largely a judge-made rule of law. 
Finally, the constitutional values protected by the rule make 
it imperative that judges-and in some cases judges of this 
Court-make sure that it is correctly applied. A few words /_/~L;~~~~_, ,J 
about each of these aspects of the rule are appropriate. ~-- ---------1 
The federal rule that prohibits a public official from recov-
ering damages for a defamatory falsehood unless he proves 
17 A finding of fact in some cases is inseparable from the principles 
through which it was deduced. At some point, the reasoning by which a 
fact is "found" crosses the line between application of those ordinary princi-
ples of logic and common experience which are ordinarily entrusted to the 
finder of fact into the realm of a legal rule upon which the reviewing court 
must exercise its own independent judgment. Where the line is drawn 
varies according to the nature of the substantive law at issue. Regarding 
certain largely factual questions in some areas of the law, the stakes-in 
terms of impact on future cases and future conduct-are too great to en-
trust them finally to the judgment of the trier of fact. 
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that the false "statement was made with 'actual malice'-that \ 
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disre-
gard ·of whe1ner 1 was a se or no , ew or tmes, supra, 
376 lf. . , a 279= , as 1 s counterpart in rules previously 
adopted by a number of state courts and extensively re-
viewed by scholars for generations. 18 The earlier defamation 
cases, in turn, have a kinship to English cases considering the 
kind of motivation that must be proved to support a common 
law action for deceit. 19 It has long been recognized that the 
formulation of a rule of this kind "allows the judge the maxi-
mum of power in passing judgment in the particular case." 20 
Moreover, the exercise of this power is the process through 
which the rule itself evolves and its integrity is maintained. 21 
As we have explained, the meaning of some concepts cannot 
be adequately expressed in a simple statement: 
18 A representative list of such cases and comments is found in footnote 
20 of the Court's opinion in New York Times, supra, 376 U. S., at 280. 
19 Under what has been characterized as the "honest liar" formula, fraud 
could be proved "when it is shown that a false representation has been 
made (1) knowinging, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, 
careless whetherrrbe true or false." Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337, 374 
(1889). 
20 "Probably the formula is less definite than it seems. Its limitations 
are perhaps largely a matter of language color. As do most English for-
mulas, it allows the judge the maximum of power in passing judgment in 
the particular case. It restricts the jury as neatly as can be done to the 
function of evaluating the evidence. But judgment under this formula can 
be turned either way with equal facility on any close case." L. Green, 
Judge and Jury, 286 (1930) (Chapter 10 of this work by Professor Green, 
cited herein, is also published in 16 Va. L. Rev. 749 (1930)). 
21 "And it must be kept in mind that the judge has another distinct func-
tion in dealing with these elements, which though not frequently called into 
play, is of the utmost importance. It involves the determination of the 
scope of the general formula, or some one of its elements. It comes into 
play in marginal cases. It requires the judge to say what sort of conduct , 
can be considered as condemned under the rules which are employed in 
such cases. It is the function through which the formulas and rules them-
selves were evolved, through which their integrity is maintained and their 
availability determined." L. Green, Judge and Jury, 304 (1930). 
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"These considerations fall short of proving St. Amant's 
reckless disregard for the accuracy of his statements 
about Thompson. 'Reckless disregard,' it is true, can-
not be fully encompassed in one infallible definition. In-
evitably its outer li~ts will be marked out through case-
by-case adjudication, as is true with so many legal 
standards for judging concrete cases, whether the stand-
ard is provided by the Constitution, statutes, or case , . 
law. Our cases, however, have furnished :rn.eani~l ~ 
guidance for the further definition of a reckless publica-
tion." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 730-731 
(1968). 
When the standard governing the decision of a particular 
case is provided by the Constitution, this Court's role in 
marking out the limits of the standard through the process of 
case-by-case adjudication is of special importance. This 
process has been vitally important in cases involving restric-
tions on the freedom of speech protected by the First Amend-
ment, particularly in those cases in which it is contended that 
the communication in issue is within one of the few classes of 
"unprotected" speech.Yt The First Amendment presupposes 
that the freedom to speak one's mind is not only an aspect of 
individual liberty-and thus a good unto itself-but also is es-
sential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of soci-
ety as a whole. Under our Constitution "there is no such 
thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may J 
seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of 
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas." 
~ v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, 418 U. S., at 339--340 
(footnote omitted). Nevertheless, there are categories of 
communcation and certain special utterences to which the 
l majestic.Eot_g,ctiQn of the First Amendment does not extend 
oecause they "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, 
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed 
82-124~0PINION 
18 BOSE CORP. v. CONSUMERS UNION OF U.S., INC. 
by the social interest in order and morality." Chaplinsky v. 
New Hamphire, 315 U. S. 568, 572 (1942). 
Lib~~s speech has been held to constitute one such cate-
gory, see Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250 (1952); oth-
ers that have been held to be outside the scope of the freedom 
of speech are fighting:JY~ords, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 U. S. 568 (1942), incitement to riot, Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969), obscenity, Roth v. United States, 
354 U. S. 476 (1957), and chlidPornography, New York v. 
Ferber, 458 U. S. 747 (1982).~ In each of these areas, the 
limits of the unprotected category, as well as the unprotected 
character of particular communications, has been determined 
by the judicial evaluation of special facts that have been 
deemed to have constitutional significance. In such cases, 
the Court has regularly conducted an inde endent review of 
the recor both to e sure a t e speech in ques 10n ac ually 
fallsWitfiin the unprotected category and to confine the pe-
rimeters of any unprotected category within acceptably nar-
22 Commercial speech was once regarded as unprotected by the First 
Amendment, see Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52 (1942), but in Vir-
ginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 
748 (1976), we rejected that broad conclusion. Though false and mislead-
ing commercial speech could be deemed to represent a category of unpro-
tected speech, see ibid., the rationale for doing so would be essentially the 
same as that involved in the libel area, viz. "[T]here is no constitutional 
va~t. " Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S., 
at 340. Moreover, since a commercial advertiser usually "seeks to dissem-
inate information about a specific prduct or service he himself provides and 
presumably knows more about than anyone else," Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, supra, 425 U. S., at 772 n. 24, 
there is a mininal "danger that governmental regulation of false or mislead-
ing price or product advertising will chill accurate and nondeceptive com-
mercial expression." Id. , at 777 (Stewart, J. concurring). 
Statements made by public employees in their employment capacity and 
not touching on matters of public concern may be considered unprotected 
in the sense that employment-related sanctions may be imposed on the 
basis of such statements. See Connick v. Myers,-- U. S. -- (1983); 
Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated Schood District, 439 U. S. 410 
(1979); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563 (1968). 
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row limits in an effort to ensure that protected expression 
will not be inhibited. Providing triers of fact with a general 
description of the type of communication whose content is un-
worthy of protection has not, in and of itself, served suffi-
ciently to narrow the category, nor served to eliminate the 
danger that decisions by triers of fact may inhibit the expres-
sion of protected ideas. 23 The principle of viewpoint neutral-
ity that underlies the First Amendment itself, see Police De-
partment of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 9fr.96 (1972), 
also imposes a special responsibility on judges whenever it is 
claimed that a particular communciation is unprotected. See 
generally, Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 4 (1949). 
We have exercised independent judgment on the question 
whether particular remarks "were so inherently inflamma-
tory as to come within that small class of 'fighting words' 
which are 'likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, 
and thereby cause a breach of the peace,"' Street v. New 
York, 394 U. S. 576, 592 (1969), and on the analogous ques-
tion whether advocacy is directed to inciting or producing im-
minent lawless action, Hess v. Indiana, 414 U. S. 105, 
108-109 (1973) (per curiam); compare id., at 111 (REHN-
QUIST, J., dissenting) ("The simple explanation for the result 
in this case is that the majority has interpreted the evidence 
differently from the courts below."); Edwards v. South Caro-
lina, 372 U. S. 229 (1963) (recognizing duty "to make an inde-
pendent examination of the whole record."); Pennekamp v. 
Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 335 (1946) ("[W]e are compelled to ex-
amine for ourselves the statements in issue to see whether or 
not they do carry a threat of clear and present danger . . . or 
23 The risk of broadening a category of unprotected speech may explain 
why one Member of this Court preferred a candid statement-"! know it 
when I see it,"-of his concept of the judicial function to a premature at-
tempt to fashion an all encompassing "shorthand description" of obscenity. 
See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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whether they are of a character which the principles of the 
First Amendment ... protect."). 24 
Similarly, although under Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 
15 (1973), the questions of what appeals to "prurient interest" 
and what is "patently offensive" under the community stand-
ard obscenity test are "essentially questions of fact," id., at 
30, we expressly recognized the "ultimate power of appel-
late courts to conduct an independent review of constitutional 
claims when necessary," id., at 25. 25 We have therefore re-
24 See also Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380, 385--387 (1927) (explaining 
that this Court will review findings of fact by a State court where a federal 
right has been denied on the basis of a fact without evidence to support it 
and where a conclusion of law as to a federal right and a finding of fact are 
so intermingled to require analysis of the facts); Gitlow v. New York, 268 
U. S. 652, 665-666 (1925); see also Schaefer v. United States, 251 U. S. 
466, 483 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see generally Broadrick v. Okla-
homa, 413 U. S. 601, 613--614 (1973) (explaining Edwards v. South Caro-
lina, 372 U. S. 229 (1963); Cox v. Louisinana, 372 U. S. 536 (1963); and 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 311 (1940)). 
25 In support of this statement, we cited Justice Harlan's opinion in Roth 
v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 497-498 (1957), where he observed: 
"The Court seems to assume that 'obscenity' is a peculiar genus of 'speech 
and press,' which is as distinct, recognizable, and classifiable as poison ivy 
is among other plants. On this basis the constitutional question before us 
simply becomes whether 'obscenity,' as an abstraction, is protected by the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments, and the question whether a particular 
book may be suppressed becomes a mere matter of classification, of 'fact,' 
to be entrusted to a factfinder and insulated from independent constitu-
tional judgment. But surely the problem cannot be solved in such a gen-
eralized fashion. Every communication has an individuality and 'value' of 
its own. The suppression of a particular writing or other tangible form of 
expression is, therefore, an individual matter, and in the nature of things 
every such suppression raises an individual constitutional problem, in 
which a reviewing court must determine for itself whether the attacked ex-
pression is suppressable within constitutional standards. Since those 
standards do not readily lend themselves to generalized definitions, the 
constitutional problem in the last analysis becomes one of particularized 
judgments which appellate courts must make for themselves. 
I do not think that reviewing courts can escape this responsibility by say-
ing that the trier of facts, be it a jury or a judge, has labeled the questioned 
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jected the contention that a jury finding of obscenity vel non 
is insulated from review so long as the jury was properly in-
structed and there is some evidence to support its findings, 
holding that substantive constitutional limitations govern. 
In Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U. S. 153, 159-161 (1974), based 
on an independent examination of the evidence-the exhi-
bition of a motion picture-the Court held that the film in 
question "could not, as a matter of constitutional law, be 
found to depict sexual conduct in a patently offensive 
way .... "I d., at 161.26 And in its recent opinion identifying 
a new category of unprotected expression-child pornogra-
phy-the Court expressly anticipated that an "independent 
examination" of the allegedly unprotected material may be 
necessary "to assure ourselves that the judgment ... 'does 
not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free ex-
pression."' New York v. Ferber, supra, 458 U. S., at 774 n. 
28 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U. S., 
at 285). 
Hence, in New York Times v. Sullivan, after announcing 
the constitutional requirement for a finding of "actual malice" 
in certain types of defamation actions, it was only natural 
that we should conduct an independent review of the evi-
dence on the dispositive constitutional issue. We explained 
our action as follows: 
matter as 'obscene,' for, if 'obscenity' is to be suppressed, the question 
whether a particular work is of that character involves not really an issue 
of fact but a question of constitutional judgment of the most sensitive and 
delicate kind." 
26 Compare Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 100, 124 (1974) 
(holding that jury determination of obscenity was supported by the evi-
dence and consistent with the applicable constitutional standard while re-
viewing petitioner's sufficiency of the evidence arguments regarding other 
issues under the test of Glasser v. United States, 418 U. S. 124 (1942)). See 
generally Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 187-190 (opinion of 
BRENNAN, J.) (de novo review required in obscenity cases); id., at 202-203 
(Warren, C. J., dissenting) (intermediate standard of review). 
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"This Court's duty is not limited to the elaboration of 
constitutional principles; we must also in proper cases re-
view the evidence to make certain that those principles 
have been constitutionally applied. This is such a case, 
particularly since the question is one of alleged trespass 
across 'the line between speech unconditionally guaran-
teed and speech which may legitimately be regulated.' 
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 525. In cases where 
that line must be drawn, the rule is that we 'examine for 
ourselves the statements in issue and the circumstances 
under which they were made to see . . . whether they 
are of a character which the principles of the First 
Amendment, as adopted by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, protect.' Pennekamp v. 
Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 335; see also One, Inc. v. Olesen, 
355 U. S. 371; Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 
U. S. 372. We must 'make an independent examination 
of the whole record,' Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 
U. S. 229, 235, so as to assure ourselves that the judg-
ment does not constitute a forbidden instrusion on the 
field of free expression." New York Times v. Sullivan, 
supra, 376 U. S., at 285 (footnote omitted). 27 
27 This Court "has an 'obligation to test challenged judgments against the 
guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments,' and in doing so 'this 
Court cannot avoid making an independent constitutional judgment on the 
facts of the case.' Jacabellis v. Ohio 378 U. S. 184, 190 (1964) [opinion of 
BRENNAN, J.]. The simple fact is that First Amendment questions of 
'constitutional fact' compel this Court's de novo review. See Edwards v. 
South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, 235 (1963); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 
U. S. 199, 205 n. 5 (1960).'' Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U. S. 29, 54 
(1971) (opinion of BRENNAN, J ., joined by BURGER, C. J ., and 
BLACKMUN, J.) 
In New York Times v. Sullivan, we were reviewing a state court judg-
ment entered on a jury verdict. Respondent had contended that the Sev-
enth Amendment precluded an independent review. Recognizing that the 
Seventh Amendment's ban on re-examination of facts tried by a jury ap-
plied to a case coming from the state courts, Chicago, Burlington and 
Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 243-246 (1897); The Justices v. 
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In Ti~c. v. Pape, 401 U. S. 279 (1971), a case in which 
the federal District Court had entered a directed verdict, we 
again conducted an independent examination of the evidence 
on the question of actual malice, labeling our definition of "ac-
tual malice" as a "constitutional rule" and stating that the 
question before us was whether that rule had been correctly 
applied to the facts of the case, id., at 284. Again we stated 
that independent inquiries "of this kind are familiar under the 
settled principle that '[i]n cases in which there is a claim of 
denial of rights under the Federal Constitution, this Court is 
not bound by the conclusions of lower courts, but will re-ex-
amine the evidentiary basis on which those conclusions are 
founded,'" noting that "in cases involving the area of tension 
between the First and Fourteenth Amendments on the one 
hand and state defamation laws on the other, we have fre-
quently had occasion to review 'the evidence in the . . . 
record to determine whether it could constitutionally support 
a judgment' for the plaintiff." Ibid. (citations omitted) 28 
In Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265, 277 (1971) 
the Court held "as a matter of constitutional law" that the 
jury could not be allowed to determine the relevance of a 
defamatory statement to the plaintiff's status as a public fig-
ure. We explained that the jury's application of such a 
standard "is unlikely to be neutral with respect to the content 
Murray, 9 Wall. 274 (1869); see generally Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 431 
(1830), we found the argument without merit, relying on our statement in 
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380, 385--386 (1927) that review of findings of 
fact is appropriate "where a conclusion of law as to a Federal right and a 
finding of fact are so intermingled as to make it necessary, in order to pass 
upon the Federal question, to analyze the facts." 
28 Justice Harlan, the lone dissenter in Time, Inc . v. Pape, observed that 
the Court had merely refound the facts in the case, but agreed that the 
Court was free to examine for itself the evidentiary bases upon which the 
decision below rested. He argued that this power need not be exercised in 
every case, but rather independent review of the evidence should be lim-
ited to cases in which certain "unusual factors" exist, such as "allegations of 
harrassment." 401 U. S., at 294. 
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of speech and holds a real danger of becoming an instrument 
for the suppression of those 'vehement, caustic, and some-
times unpleasantly sharp attacks,' New York Times, supra, 
at 270, which must be protected if the guarantees of the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments are to prevail." Ibid. 29 
The requirement of independent appellate review reit-I 
era ted in New York Times v. Sullivan is a rule of federal con-
stitutional law. It emerged from the exigency of deciding 
concrete cases; it is law in its purest form under our common 
law heritage. It reflects a deeply held conviction that 
judges-and particularly members of this Court-must exer-
cise such review in order to preserve the precious liberties 
established and ordained by the Constitution. The question 
whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is of 
the convincing clarity required to strip the utterance of First 
Amendment protection is not merely a question for the trier 
of fact. Judges, as expositors of the Constitution, must in-
dependently decide whether the evidence in the record is suf-
ficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the en-
try of any judgment that is not supported by clear and 
convincing proof of "actual malice." 
III 
The Court of Appeals was correct in its conclusions (1) that 
there is a significant difference between proof of actual mal-
ice 30 and mere proof Oirarsity, and (2) that such add1honal 
proof is lacking m tlhs case. 
29 A similar concern with the need to "preserve the right of free speech 
both from suppression by tyrannous, well-meaning majorities and from 
abuse by irresponsible, fanatical minorities," Schaefer v. United States, 
251 U. S. , at 482 (1920) (dissenting opinion) was identified by Justice Bran-
deis in explaining the special risk in allowing jurors to evaluate the charac-
ter of the "clear and present danger" presented by arguably seditious 
speech. 
30 The burden of proving "actual malice" requires the plaintiff to demon-
strate with clear and convincing evidence that the defendant realized that 
his statement was false or that he subjectively entertained serious doubt as 
to the truth of his statement. See, e. g. , New York Times v. Sullivan, 
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The factual portion of the District Court's opinion may 
fairly be read as including the following findings: (1) 
Seligson's actual perception of the apparent movement of the 
sound source at the time the Bose 901 was tested was "along 
the wall" rather than "about the room"; (2) even when the 
words in the disputed sentence are read in the context of the 
entire article, neither the "average reader," nor any other 
intelligent person, would interpret the word "about" to mean 
"across"; (3) Seligson is an intelligent, well educated person; 
(4) the words "about the room" have the same meaning for 
Seligson as they do for the populace in general; and (5) al-
though he was otherwise a credible witness, Seligson's testi-
mony that (a) he did not "know what made me pick that par-
ticular choice of words" and (b) that the word "about" meant 
what he had drawn on the board, is not credible. 
When the testimony of a witness is not believed, the trier 
of fact may simply disregard it. Normally the discredited 
testimony is not considered ~ficient basis for drawing a 
contrary conclusion. See Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Rail-
way Co., 340 U. S. 573, 575 (1951). In this case the trial 
judge found it impossible to believe that Seligson continued 
to maintain that the word "about" meant "across." 
Seligson's testimony does not rebut any inference of actual 
malice that the record otherwise supports, but it is equally 
clear that it does not constitute clear and convincing evidence 
of actual malice. Seligson displayed a capacity for ratio-
nalization. He had made a mistake and when confronted 
with it, he refused to admit it and steadfastly attempted to 
maintain that no mistake had been made-that the inaccurate 
was accurate. That attempt failed, but the fact that he made 
the attempt does not establish that he realized the 
innaccuracy at the time of publication. 
supra, 376 U. S., at 280; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, supra, 418 U. S., 
at 342; St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 731 (1968); see generally 
W. Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts 771-772, 821 (4th ed. 1971). 
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Aside from Seligson's vain attempt to defend his statement 
as a precise description of the nature of the sound movement, 
the only evidence of actual malice on which the District Court 
relied" was Enefuct tliat the sfatement was an inaccurate de-
scription of whaf"Sel}gsonhad actually erceived. Seligson 
of course ha msis ed "I know what I heard." The trial 
court took him at his word, and reasoned that since he did 
know what he had heard, and he knew that the meaning of 
the language employed did not accurately reflect what he 
heard, he must have realized the statement was inaccurate at 
the time he wrote it. "Analysis of this kind may be adequate 
when the alleged libel purports to be an eyewitness or other 
direct account of events that speak for themselves." Time, 
Inc. v. Pape, supra, 401 U. S., at 279. Here, however, 
adoption of the language chosen was "one of a number of pos-
sible rational interpretations" of an event "that bristled with 
ambiquities" and descriptive challenges for the writer. Id., 
at 290. The choice of such language, though reflecting a mis-
conception, does not place the speech beyond the outer limits 
of the First Amendment's broad protective umbrella. 
Under the District Court's analysis, any individual using a 
malapropism might be liable, simply because an intelligent 
speaker would have to know that the term was inaccurate in 
context, even though he did not realize his folly at the time. 
The statement in this case represents the sort of inaccu-
racy that is commonplace in the forum of robust debate to 
which the New York Times rule a~"Re­
alistically, . . . some error is inevitable; and the difficulties of 
separating fact from fiction convinced the Court in New York 
Times, Butts, Gertz, and similiar cases to limit liability to in-
stances where some degree of culpability is present in order 
to eliminate the risk of undue self-censorship and the sup-
pression of truthful material." Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 
153, 171-172 (1979). "[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in 
free debate, and . . . must be protected if the freedoms of eX-
pre~o have the 'breathing space' that they '!leed . . . 
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to survive.'" New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, 376 
U. S., at 271-272 (citation omitted). 
The Court of Appeals entertained some doubt concerning 
the ruling that the New York Times rule should be applied to 
a claim of product disparagement based on a critical review of 
a loudspeaker system. We express no view on that ruling, 
but having accepted it for purposes of deciding this case, we 
agree with the Court of Appeals that the difference between 
hearing violin sounds move around the room and hearing 
them wander back and forth fits easily within the breathing 
space that gives life to the First Amendment. We may ac-
cept all of the purely factual findings of the District Court and 
nevertheless hold as a matter of law that the record does not 
contain clear and convincing evidence that Seligson or his em-
ployer prepared the loudspeaker article with knowledge that 
it contained a false statement, or with reckless disregard of 
the truth. 
It may well be that in this case, the "finding" of the District 
Court on the actual malice question could have been set aside 
under the clearly erroneous standard of review, and we share 
the concern of the Court of Appeals that the statements at --issue tread the line between fact and opinion. Moreover, the 
analYsis oftlleCentral legal quesbon before us may seem out 
of place in a case involving a dispute about the sound quality 
of a loudspeaker. But though the question presented 
reaches us on a somewhat peculiar wavelength, we reaffirm \ 
the principle of independent appellate review t at we ave 
applied uncounted times Before. We hold thaftfie clearfy er-
roneouSStandar<l of Rule "52(a) of1he Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure does not prescribe the standard of review to be ap-
plied in reviewing a determination of actual malice in a case 
governed by New York Times v. Sullivan. Appellate judges 
in such a case must exercise in ependent judgment and~de­
termine whether the record establishes actual malice · . 
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convincing clarity. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
•'' I . • .... , .. ,' __.:..-~ ' 
CHAMI!I!:R& 0,-
JUSTICE WN . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.hprtmt Qlcnrl Df tfrt ~b ~taft• 
~~ J. Of. 2.0~,.~ 
March 14, 1984 
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March 14, 1984 
/ 
Re: No. 82-1246 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of 
United States 
Dear John: 
In due course I will circulate a dissent. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
.Suprtntt Q}qud llf tlrt~~ j)ta.trs 
'lllasfringbrn. ~. <!f. 2D.;iJ!~ 
' . 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
March 15, 1984 
Re: No. 82-1246-Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union 
of United States 
Dear John: 




cc: The Conference 
lfp/ss 03/23/84 BOSE SALLY-POW 
82-1246 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union 
Dear John: 
I have now had an opportunity to read your 
opinion with some care. I am, of course, with you on the 
result and,._o-:i"lat:-t ::r~ ~r 
opiRiOR-i 
My concern is primarily one of emphasis. As you 
state, in this case "two well-settled and respected rules 
of law point in opposite directions". It is clear, of 
course, that iR efi~ ca!!'e ~where a "public figure is suing 
a media defendant for libel, New York Times requires proof 
of actual malice. It also is clear that New York Times, 
2. 
' . 
As you state (p. 13) , our "standard of review 
must be faithful to both Rule 52(a) and the independent 
review of New York Times. My impression, however, as one 
reads your opinion, is that it leaves little room for the 
application of Rule 52(a) is any libel suit against the 
media. At Conference, Bill Brennan drew a distinction 
between the type of evidence that an appellate court in 
cases of this kind is obligated to review. It is 
~ 
unnecessary literally~eview the "entire record", but only 
such portions of it as relate to the constitutional facts. 
In this case, for example, the bench trial lasted 19 days. 
There must be many facts, irrelevant to the constitutional 
standard of New York Times, that are subject to Rule 
52(a). I am sure you would agree. It would be helpful if 








MM¥y-€e~e~R~c~g~r~n~l~·o&-~t~naet~ should take care not to 
A 
write this case in a way that weakens the application of 
Rule 52(a) in other types of cases or~ in libel cases 
with respect to non-constitutional facts. The Court of 
Appeals characterized its duty as being that of "de novo" 
review. It is important to state that CAl was incorrect 
in characterizing the New York Times standard of review as 
"de novo". Perhaps you have said this, though I do not 
recall having seen it. 
The very last senten 
is the duty of appellate judges, ·n cases of this kind, to 
determine whether the 
This will be viewed, I think, 
the standard of review is "clear and 
nvincing" rather than preponderance of the evidence. 
~ 37b ~.S. J~ 
~'<IS-6-'6~. t-~~ ~ SS$.!01\ ~ ~ ~~(_~j~ lot,~ 
~ ~~ ~ \~\J- ~'\~VM ~ ~ ~ , ( 9-". ~~, 
required this level of proof? If not, should we do 
-~------~~ 1s ca~ 
I add, John, a personal observation or two 
frequent criticism that I hear of the Cou 
opinions are unnecessarily long, and 
nnecessarily include footnotes tha 
bar. I do not 
that 
4. 
uggest that any of free from being "guilty" in both 
I am embarrassed to read some of the 
opinions in past years by the dilution of 
hat has resulted from how much I wrote and what I 
n footnotes. As I read your opinion, interesting and 
written as it is, these questions came to mind as 




o not say this in criticism. Rather, 
~--
I merely share 
houghts that concern me about my own opinions. Of 
course, Bose Corp. will be a major First Amendment 
/ 
/ 





§ 580A TORTS, SECOND Ch. 24 
privilege" of publishing false and defamatory statements regard-
ing a public official or public figure when there is no knowledge 
of falsity or recklessness regarding truth or falsity. Here it is 
held that the plaintiff has the burden of alleging and proving 
that the defendant had knowledge or acted in reckless disregard. 
f. Weight of evidence. Not only does the plaintiff have the 
burden of raising the issue of knowledge or reckless disregard 
and of proving that the defendant's conduct was outside the scope 
of the constitutional protection, but the proof must be "with con-
vincing clarity." This requirement, also described as one of "clear 
and convincing proof," is held to be imposed by the Constitution. 
Proof by more than a preponderance of the evidence has not 
been specifically required for any other factual issue in a defama-
tion action. Some language of the Supreme Court, however, has 
suggested that this requirement may be imposed on the plaintiff 
regarding the question of whether the communication was made 
of and concerning the plaintiff. There may also be other issues 
on which the Court will decide to impose the obligation of a high-
er degree of proof. 
g. Constitutional standard; appellate review. The issue of 
whether the defendant acted with knowledge of falsity or in reck-
less pisregard of truth or falsity is usually called one of fact that 
is submitted to the jury for it to make a determination as to 
whether the plaintiff has proved his contention with convincing 
clarity. Actually, however, it involves both a determination of 
the facts and an application to them of a standard, similar to the 
determination of whether a defendant was negligent or not. The 
determination here is one on which constitutional rights stand or 
fall, and it is analogous in this regard to the classic instance in 
criminal law of the constitutional guaranty against self-in-
crimination and the application of a constitutional standard for 
determining whether a confession was given voluntarily or not. 
A finding on an issue of this nature is subject to close appellate 
scrutiny, and an appellate court may declare that the evidence is 
constitutionally inadequate to sustain the finding. The United 
States Supreme Court has on several occasions reviewed the 
evidence to decide whether the evidence justified a finding of 
knowledge or reckless disregard, and it has not hesitated to hold 
that the constitutional requirement of proof with convincing 
clarity has not been met, despite the jury verdict. 
The Supreme Court has also stated that the issue of whether 
the defamatory communication was made "of and concerning" 


















Ch. 24 INTEREST IN REPUTATION § 580B 
the plaintiff is one involving constitutional rights. It has held 
on occasion that the evidence on this issue was constitutionally 
defective because it was incapable of supporting a jury's finding 
on this issue. 
h. Public and private communications. Most of the Supreme 
Court cases concerning the constitutional protection covered by 
this Section have involved freedom of the press-newspapers, 
magazines or broadcasting. All have involved public state-
ments. It is therefore possible that since the protection applies 
to statements about public officials or public figures it may be 
confined to public communications and not be extended to those 
made in a private fashion to one person or to a small number of 
persons. But, on principle, there seems no reason to limit the 
protection in this fashion. Why should one be constitutionally 
protected if he issues a public statement about the qualifications 
or character of the mayor of the city and yet not be protected if 
he makes the same statement in the privacy of his home to his 
next-door neighbor? Though the issue has not been specifically 
raised, there would also appear to be little reason to draw a dis-
tinction between libel and slander in this regard. 
i. Other applications of the Constitution to actions for defa-
mation. This Section sets forth one of the most significant re-
strictions that the First Amendment to the Constitution has been 
held to impose upon an action of defamation. After this restric-
tion was established others were also held by the Supreme Court 
to apply. Thus strict liability for defamation is no longer con-
stitutional (see § 580B); recovery is limited, at least in some 
cases, to actual harm proved to have been caused to reputation 
(see § 621); and a defamation action does not lie for the expres-
sion of a mere opinion. (See § 566). On the constittuional 
requirement of fault in the report of an official action or proceed-
ing or a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of 
public concern, see § 611. On application of the Constitution 
to an action for invasion of the right of privacy, see § § 652D and 
652E. 
§ 580B. Defamation of Private Person 
One who publishes a false and defamatory commmlica-
cation concerning a private person, or concerning a pub-
lic official or public figure in relation to a purely private 
matter not affecting his conduct, fitness or role in his 
public capacity, is subject to liability, if, but only if, he 
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References 
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March 23, 1984 
82-1246 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union 
Dear John: 
I have now had an opportunity to read your opinion 
with some care. I am, of course, with you on the result and 
certainly with the greater part of your opinion. 
In light of the Conference discussion today of Dun 
& Bradstreet (carried over for further consideration at next 
week's Conference), woulr'! it not be Hell to make somewhat 
clearer that this case involves only a media defendant? 
This is implicit throughout your opinion, but t do not re-
call a soecific characterization of Consumers Union. Per-
haps all that need be said is to add a few words on page 3. 
You refer there to the DC havinq ruled that Bose rorp. is a 
"public figure", and that therefore New York Times applieos. 
I suggest that in 8th line, after the word "act1on" you 
might add: "against a media defendant". 
T have delayed joining your opinion also because 
of some concern as to its emphasis. As you state, in this 
case "two well-settled and respected rules of. law point in 
opposite directions". It is clear, of course, where a "pub-
lic fiqure is suing a media defendant for libel, New York 
Times requires proof of actual malice. It also is clear 
that New York Times, and is proqeny, require an appellate 
court to "make an independent examination of the whole 
record". 
As you state (p. 13), our "standard of review must 
be faithful to both Rule 52(a) and the independent review of 
New York Times. My impression, however, as one reads your 
opinion, is that it leaves little room for the application 
of Rule 52(a) in any libel suit against the media. At Con-
ference, Bill Brennan distinguished between the types of. 
evidence that an appellate court reviews in a case of this 
kind. It usually is unnecessary literally to review the 
"entire r~cord", but only such portions of it as relate to 
the constitutional facts. In this case, for example, the 
2. 
bench trial lasted 19 days. There must be many facts, ir-
relevant to the constitutional standard of New York Times, 
that are subject to Rule 52(a). I am sure you would aqree. 
It would be helpful if this were made explicitly clear in 
our opinion. 
We should take care, I think, not to write this 
case in a way that weakens the app11cation of Rule 52(a) in 
other types of cases or tn libel cases with respect to non-
constitutional facts. The Court of Appeals characterized 
its nuty as being that of "de novo" review. Should we not 
state that CAl was incorrect in characterizing the New York 
Times standard of review as "de novo". Perhaps you have 
said this, thouqh I do not recall havinq seen it. 
If modest changes like these ara made T will be 
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
March 26, 1984 
Re: 82-1246 - Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union 
Dear Lewis: 
Many thanks for your letter. As always, your 
suggestions make good sense. I propose to add these 
two footnote: 
1) Insert as new ~ in fn. 8 on p. 6: 
We observe that respondent's publication of 
Consumer Reports plainly would qualify it as a 
"media" defendant in this action under any 
conceivable definition of that term. Hence, the 
answer to the question presented in Dunn & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 
certiorari granted, U. S. (1983) could 
not affect this case and we naturally express no 
view at this time on that question. 
2) Insert as fn. 31 on p. 27: 
There are, of course, many findings of fact 
in a defamation case that are irrelevant to the 
constitutional standard of New York Times v. 
Sullivan and to which the clearly erroneous 
standard of Rule 52(a) is fully applicable. 
Indeed, it is not actually necessary to review the 
"entire" record to fulfill the function of 
independent appellate review on the actual malice 
question; rather, only those portions of the 
record which relate to the actual malice 
determination must be independently assessed. The 
independent review function is not equivalent to a 
"de novo" review of the ultimate judgment itself, 
in which a reviewing court makes an original 
appraisal of all the evidence to decide whether or 
not it believes that judgment should be entered 
for plaintiff. If the reviewing Court determines 
that actual malice has been established with 
-2-
convincing clarity, the judgment of the trial 
court may only be reversed on the ground of some 
other error of law or clearly erroneous finding of 
fact. Although the Court of Appeals stated that 
it must perform a de novo review, it is plain that 
the Court of Appeals did not overturn any factual 
finding to which Rule 52(a) would be applicable, 
but instead engaged in an independent assessment 
only of the evidence germane to the actual malice 
determination. 




.§npumt <lfourl Df Ur.t ,.nit.tlt .§tatt.tr 
';Jiru4ittgton, ~. <If. 20.?~~ 
.JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
March 26, 1984 
Re: 82-1246 - Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union 
Dear Lewis: 
Many thanks for your letter. As always, your 
suggestions make good sense. I propose to add these 
two footnote: 
1) Insert as new ~ in fn. 8 on p. 6: 
We observe that respondent's publication of 
Consumer Reports plainly would qualify it as a 
"media" defendant in this action under any 
conceivable definition of that term. Hence, the 
answer to the question presented in Dunn & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 
certiorari granted, U. s. (1983) could 
not affect this case and we naturally express no 
view at this time on that question. 
2) Insert as fn. 31 on p. 27: 
There are, of course, many findings of fact 
in a defamation case that are irrelevant to the 
constitutional standard of New York Times v. 
Sullivan and to which the clearly erroneous 
standard of Rule 52(a) is fully applicable. 
Indeed, it is not actually necessary to review the 
"entire" record to fulfill the function of 
independent appellate review on the actual malice 
question~ rather, only those portions of the 
record which relate to the actual malice 
determination must be independently assessed. The 
independent review function is not equivalent to a 
"de novo" review of the ultimate judgment itself, 
in which a reviewing court makes an original 
appraisal of all the evidence to decide whether or 
not it believes that judgment should be entered 
for plaintiff. If the reviewing Court determines 
that actual malice has been established with 
-2-
convincing clarity, the judgment of the trial 
court may only be reversed on the ground of some 
other error of law or clearly erroneous finding of 
fact. Although the Court of Appeals stated that 
it must perform a de novo review, it is plain that 
the Court of Appeals did not overturn any factual 
finding to which Rule 52(a) would be applicable, 
but instead engaged in an independent assessment 
only of the evidence germane to the actual malice 
determination. 
Do you think these changes will be adequate? 
Respectfully, 
Justice Powell 
STYLISTIC CH,;r~ ES TH~O~GHOUT. 












From: Justice Stevens 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: _ ____,M= A,_,_,R'-'----"'2'--'-7_ 1'-""'9"""8 _._4 _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-1246 
BOSE CORPORATION, PETITIONER v. CONSUMERS 
UNION OF UNITED STATES, INC. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
[March -, 1984] 
JusTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
An unusual metaphor in a critical review of an unusual 
loudspeaker system gave rise to product disparagement liti-
gation that presents us with a procedural question of first im-
pression: Does Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure prescribe the standard to be applied by the Court of 
Appeals in its review of a District Court's determination that 
a false statement was made with the kind of "actual malice" 
described in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 
279--280 (1964)? 
In the May 1970 issue of its magazine, "Consumer Re-
ports," respondent published a seven-page article evaluating 
the quality of numerous brands of medium priced loudspeak-
ers. In a boxed-off section occupying most of two pages, re-
spondent commented on "some loudspeakers of special inter-
est," one of which was the Bose 901-an admittedly "unique 
and unconventional" system that had recently been placed on 
the market by petitioner. 1 After describing the system and 
some of its virtues, and after noting that a listener "could pin-
point the location of various instruments much more easily 
1 In introducing the loudspeaker system to the marketplace, petitioner 
emphasized the unconventional nature of the system and actively solicited 
reviews in numerous publications thereby inviting critical evaluation and 
comment on the unique qualities of the system. 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1273 
(D. Mass. 1981). 
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with a standard speaker than with the Bose system," re-
spondent's article made the following statements: 
"Worse, individual instruments heard through the 
Bose system seemed to grow to gigantic proportions and 
tended to wander about the room. For instance, a vio-
lin appeared to be 10 feet wide and a piano ·stretched 
from wall to wall. With orchestral music, such effects 
seemed inconsequential. But we think they might be-
come annoying when listening to soloists." Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 2, at 274. 
Mter stating opinions concerning the overall sound quality, 
the article concluded: "We think the Bose system is so un-
usual that a prospective buyer must listen to it and judge it 
for himself. We would suggest delaying so big an invest-
ment until you were sure the system would please you after 
the novelty value had worn off." I d., at 275. 
Petitioner took exception to numerous statements made in 
the article, and when respondent refused to publish a retrac-
tion, petitioner commenced this product disparagement ac-
tion in the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts. 2 After a protracted period of pretrial dis-
covery, the District Court denied respondent's motion for 
summary judgment, 84 F. R. D. 682 (1980), and conducted a 
19-day bench trial on the issue of liability. In its lengthy, 
detailed opinion on the merits of the case, 508 F. Supp. 1249 
2 Federal jurisdiction over the product disparagement claim was based 
on diversity of citizenship, 28 U. S. C. § 1332(a)(1). The law of New York 
and Massachusetts, viewed by the parties as in accord in this area, gov-
erned the product disparagement claim. 508 F. Supp. , at 1259 n. 17. The 
District Court held that under the applicable state law, plaintiff had the 
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the state-
ments in issue were false and disparaging, and also had the burden of 
establishing actual damages in order to recover. !d., at 1259-1260. In ad-
dition to the product disparagement claim, petitioner alleged claims for un-
fair competition and a violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1121. 
The District Court held that neither of those claims had been proven. 508 
F. Supp., at 1277. 
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(1981), the District Court ruled in respondent's favor on 
most issues. 3 Most significantly, the District Court ruled 
that the petitioner is a "public figure" as that term is defined 
in Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 342, 345, 
351-352 (1974) for purposes of this case and therefore the 
First Amendment, as interpreted in New York Times v. Sul-
livan, supra, 376 U. S., at 27~280, precludes recovery in \ 
this product disparagement action unless the petitioner 
proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent 
made a false disparaging statement with "actual malice." 
On three critical points, however, the District Court 
agreed with petitioner. First, it found that one sentence in 
3 Petitioner's attack on the article included contentions that it was mis-
leading in referring to two persons as a "panel" and in creating the impres-
sion that evaluations of loudspeaker quality are objective rather than sub-
jective judgments. While the District Court agreed with petitioner on 
these points, it ruled that they did not entitle petitioner to relief. 508 F . 
Supp., at 1260-1262. Petitioner also argued that the overall sound quality 
of the Bose 901 should have been rated higher by the reviewers. The Dis-
trict Court rejected this claim, observing that all of the testimony, includ-
ing that of Dr. Bose, revealed that the evaluation of a speaker's "sound 
quality" or "accuracy" is a "subjective matter," and hence in the final analy-
sis is "nothing more than an opinion and, as such, it cannot be proved to be 
true of false." Id. , at 1262. The court also found that petitioner had 
failed to prove false a statement recommending use of an amplifier of 50 
watts per channel to achieve the "deepest" bass response with the speak-
ers, observing that the parties had conceded that the power requirements 
of the speakers were readily and objectively ascertainable. I d., at 
1263-1264. The court also found that petitioner had failed to prove that 
the person primarily responsible for the article was biased by reason of his 
financial interest in eventually marketing a speaker on which he had ob-
tained a patent. On the other hand, the District Court rejected respond-
ent's argument that there could be no actual malice because respondent 
had no motive to distort the facts; the District Court identified two possible 
reasons for the disparagement, first, the "scant proof" that respondent had 
a "built in bias" against "higher priced products" and second, a suggestion 
in the testimony that respondent resorted to "sarcasm" to boost circula-
tion. Id., at 1275-1276. The District Court did not, however, rely upon 
these possible motivations as affirmative proof of actual malice. See id., 
at 1276-1277. 
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the article contained a "false" statement of "fact" concern-
ing the tendency of the instruments to wander. 4 Based pri-
marily on testimony by the author of the article, the District 
Court found that instruments heard through the speakers 
tended to wander "along the wall," rather than "about the 
- room" as reported by respondent. 5 Second, it found that the 
statement was disparaging. Third, it concluded "on the 
basis of proof which it considers clear and convincing, that 
the plaintiff has sustained its burden of proving that the de-
fendant published a false statement of material fact with 
• In its ruling on respondent's motion for summary judgment, the Dis-
trict Court had held that the question whether respondent's panelists "ac-
tually heard instruments grow to gigantic proportions or wander about the 
room is a question of fact, not opinion .... " 84 F. R. D., at 684. In sup-
port of the motion for summary judgment, respondent had submitted an 
affidavit by one of the panelists, Arnold Seligson, stating that the article 
accurately reported what was heard in the tests and "I know what I 
heard," while petitioner had submitted an affidavit by Dr. Bose, who de-
signed the Bose 901, stating in substance that "the phenomenom of wid-
ened and wandering instruments ... is a scientific impossibility." Ibid. 
• Although at one point the District Court seemed to suggest that the 
instruments, i. e. the sound, did not wander at all, relying on a review in 
another publication stating that "each instrument has its prescribed 
space-and it stays there," 508 F. Supp., at 1268 (emphasis supplied by the 
District Court) (citation omitted), the District Court had previously stated 
that some degree of "movement" of sound between loudspeakers is com-
mon to all systems and its discussion of liability indicates that respondent 
could have truthfully reported that the sound tended to wander "along the 
wall," or at least "seemed" to wander along the wall. It is not entirely 
clear that the District Court made a finding of fact as such regarding where 
the sound tended to wander. Indeed, it is not entirely clear that he found 
as a fact that the sound did not wander about the room. Rather, as dis-
cussed more extensively infra, at --, the finding seemed to be that the 
"panel" conducting the test did not subjectively perceive the sound to be 
wandering "about the room," but rather perceived it to be wandering 
"across the room." Just where the sound did "wander," in reality, did not 
appear to be the focus of the decision, though there was conflicting testi-
mony concerning whether it was "scientifically impossible" for sound to 
wander "about" the room, or to "seem" to wander "about" the room. See 
508 F. Supp., at 1267-1269, 127~1277. 
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knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of its 
truth or falsity." 508 F. Supp., at 1277.6 Judgment was 
entered for petitioner on the product disparagement claim. 7 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
reversed. 692 F. 2d 189 (1982). The court accepted the find-
ing that the comment about wandering instruments was dis-
paraging. It assumed, without deciding, that the statement 
was one of fact, rather than opinion, and that it was false, ob-
serving that "stemming at least in part from the uncertain 
nature of the statement as one of fact or opinion, it is difficult 
to determine with confidence whether it is true or false." 
I d., at 194. After noting that petitioner did not contest the 
conclusion that it was a public figure, or the applicability of 
the New York Times standard, the Court of Appeals held 
that its review of the "actual malice" determination was not 
6 In its ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the District Court 
assumed, without deciding, that the actual malice standard would be appli-
cable in the case and expressly recognized that falsity alone does not prove 
that statements were made with actual malice, observing that additional 
facts are required, and that there must be clear and convincing evidence on 
this question. 84 F. R. D., at 684-685. In holding that there was a mate-
rial issue of "fact" (a label we use advisedly) on actual malice, the District 
Court recounted petitioner's argument that the panelists must have known 
the statements concerning enlarged and wandering instruments were false 
because they were false, ibid. ("[A]ccording to plaintiff, the panel could not 
have heard these phenomena and the statement that they did hear them 
was false. The plaintiff further contends that because Seligson was a 
member of the listening panel .. . he must have known that the statement 
was false . . .. "). The court also noted petitioner's evidence concerning 
Seligison's patent on a speak~r system, and indulging in all reasonable in-
ferences favorable to the plaintiff, concluded that a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact existed on the question of actual malice. !d., at 686. 
7 A separate trial before a different judge on the issue of damages re-
sulted in a finding that the false disparaging statement resulted in a sales 
loss of 824 units, each of which would have produced a net profit of $129, 
causing petitioner damages of $106,296. Petitioner also was awarded 
$9,000 for expenses incurred in an attempt to mitigate damages. Judg-
ment for the total amount, plus interest, was entered by the District 
Court. 529 F. Supp. 357 (1981). 
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"limited" to the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a); in-
stead, it stated that it "must perform a de novo review, inde-
pendently examining the record to ensure that the district 
court has applied properly the governing constitutional law 
and that the plaintiff has indeed satisfied its burden of proof." 
I d., at 195. It added, however, that it "was in no position to 
consider the credibility of witnesses and must leave such 
questions of demeanor to the trier of fact." Ibid. Based on 
its own review of the record, the Court of Appeals concluded: 
"[W]e are unable to find clear and convincing evidence 
that CU published the statement that individual instru-
ments tended to wander about the room with knowledge 
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it 
was false or not. The evidence presented merely shows 
that the words in the article may not have described pre-
cisely what the two panelists heard during the listening 
test. CU was guilty of using imprecise language in the 
article-perhaps resulting from an attempt to produce a 
readable article for its mass audience. Certainly this 
does not support an inference of actual malice." I d., at 
197.8 
We granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of 
Appeals erred when it refused to apply the clearly erroneous 
standard of Rule 52(a) to the District Court's "finding" of ac-
tual malice. --U.S.- (1983). 
8 Judge Campbell concurred specially to emphasize the fact that the 
Court of Appeals had not passed on the merits of the District Court's hold-
ing that petitioner was a public figure. We, of course, also do not pass on 
that question. 
We observe that respondent's publication of Consumer Reports plainly 
would qualify it as a "media" defendant in this action under any conceivable 
definition of that term. Hence, the answer to the question presented in 
Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., certiorari granted, 
- U. S.- (1983) could not affect this case and we naturally express 
no view at this time on that question. 
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I 
To place the issue in focus, it is necessary to state in some-
what greater detail (a) the evidence on the "actual malice" 
issue; and (b) the basis for the District Court's determination. 
Evidence of Actual Malice. 
At trial petitioners endeavored to prove that the key sen-
tence embodied three distinct falsehoods about instruments 
heard through the Bose system: (1) that their size seemed 
grossly enlarged; (2) that they seemed to move; and (3) that 
their movement was "about the room." 
Although a great deal of the evidence concerned the first 
two points, the District Court found that neither was false. 
It concluded that the average reader would understand that 
the reference to enlarged instruments was intended to de-
scribe the size of the area from which the sound seemed to 
emanate rather than to any perception about the actual size 
of the musical instruments being played, rejecting as "ab-
surd" the notion that readers would interpret the figurative 
language literally. 508 F. Supp., at 1266.9 After referring to 
testimony explaining "that a certain degree of movement of 
the apparent sound source is to be expected with all stereo 
loudspeaker systems," the District Court recognized that the 
statement was accurate insofar as it reported that "instru-
ments ... tended to wander .... " !d., at 1267. Thus, nei-
ther the reference to the apparent size of the instruments, 
nor the reference to the fact that instruments appeared to 
9 "Therefore, the plaintiff did not present any evidence to contradict the 
defendant's evidence which tended to show that when listening to the Bose 
901 a listener could and does perceive that the apparent sound source is 
very large. Thus, the court concludes that the plaintiff has not sustained 
its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's 
statement-'instruments ... seemed to grow to gigantic proportions'-
was false." 508 F. Supp., at 1267. 
82-1246-0PINION 
8 BOSE CORP. v. CONSUMERS UNION OF U.S., INC. 
move, was false. 10 
The statement that instruments tended to wander "about 
the room" was found false because what the listeners in the 
test actually perceived was an apparent movement back and 
forth along the wall in front of them and between the two 
speakers. Because an apparent movement "about the 
room"-rather than back and forth-would be so different 
from what the average listener has learned to expect, the 
District Court concluded "that the location of the movement 
of the apparent sound source is just as critical to a reader as 
the fact that movement occurred." Ibid. 
The evidence concerning respondent's knowledge of this 
falsity focused on Arnold Seligson, an engineer employed by 
respondent. Seligson supervised the test of the Bose 901 
and prepared the written report upon which the published ar-
ticle was based. His initial in-house report contained this 
sentence: "'Instruments not only could not be placed with 
precision but appeared to suffer from giganticism and a tend-
ency to wander around the room; a violin seemed about 10 ft. 
wide, a piano stretched from wall to wall, etc.'" I d., at 1264, 
n. 28. Since the editorial revision from "around the room" to 
"about the room" did not change the meaning of the false 
statement, and since there was no evidence that the editors 
were aware of the inaccuracy in the original report, the ac-
tual malice determination rests entirely on an evaluation of 
Seligson's state of mind when he wrote his initial report, or 
when he checked the article against that report. 
Seligson was deposed before trial and testified for almost 
six days at the trial itself. At one point in his direct exami-
nation, he responded at length to technical testimony by Dr. 
Bose, explaining the scientific explanation for the apparent 
movement of the source of sound back and forth across a wall. 
Joint App. 117-122. The trial judge then questioned 
10 Thus, respondent prevailed on both of the issues of fact that had been 
identified at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings. See n. 4, 
supra. 
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Seligson, and that questioning revealed that the movement 
which Seligson had heard during the tests was confined to the 
wall. 11 During his cross-examination, at counsel's request he 
drew a rough sketch of the movement of the sound source 
that he intended to describe with the words "tended to wan-
der about the room"; that sketch revealed a back and forth 
movement along the wall between the speakers. He was 
then asked: 
"Q. Mr. Seligson, why did you use the words 'tended 
to wander about the room' to describe what you have 
drawn on the board? 
"A. Well, I don't know what made me pick that par-
ticular choice of words. Would you have been more sat-
isfied if we said 'across,'-I think not-instead of before. 
I have the feeling you would have objected in either 
event. The word 'about' meant just as I drew it on the 
11 The following questions were asked and answered: 
"Q. Does that explain, in your opinion, the lateral movement of the 
instrument? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. I think your statement in the article which says they moved into the 
room, just as if they came forward, as well- · 
"A. The example given for the movement into the room refers only to a 
widened violin and a widened piano and was meant to imply only that the 
widening and movement was across the rear wall from the two speakers. 
"Q. 'It tended to wander about the room.' It didn't say from side to 
side or against the walls alone, but it says-
"A. I believe the next sentence is meant to explain that. It then says, 
'For instance,' as an example of the effect. 
"Q. The word 'about' means around, doesn't it? 
"A. It was, your Honor, it was meant to mean about the rear wall, be-
tween the speakers. 
"Q. That isn't what it says, though. 
"A. I understand." 
Joint App. 122-124 
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board. Now, I so testified in my deposition"--Joint 
App. 169.'2 
The District Court's Actual Malice Determination. 
The District Court's reasons for finding falsity in the de-
scription of the location of the movement of the wandering in-
struments provided the background for its ruling on actual 
malice. The court concluded that "no reasonable reader" 
would understand the sentence as describing lateral move-
ment along the wall. Because the "average reader" would 
interpret the word "about" according to its "plain ordinary 
meaning," the District Court unequivocally rejected 
Seligson's testimony-and respondent's argument-that the 
sentence, when read in context, could be understood to refer 
to lateral movement. 13 
12 These additional questions were then asked and answered: 
"Q. Would it have been more accurate in your judgment to say that the 
instruments tended to move back and forth between the two speakers? 
"A. No, I don't think so, taken in context of the way it's described. Re-
member, the effect is carefully described in a few sentences later. It's 
hard to mistake. 
"Q. Is there anything in the article which you think conveys to the 
reader the idea that the instruments stayed down at one end of the room 
and didn't come out and wander about, like you wandered about, where 
you have drawn the orange line? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. What is that? 
"A. I would think that the reader would get that from reading that a 
violin appeared to be ten feet wide and a piano stretched from wall to wall. 
This is no hint of depth or whatever, entering into the room." Joint App. 
169-170. 
13 The District Court buttressed this conclusion by pointing out that peti-
tioner had received no complaints from purchasers about any wandering 
instruments, and that no other reviews of the Bose 901 had referred to 
wandering instruments. On the contrary, a review quoted by the District 
Court commented that "each instrument has its prescribed space-and it 
stays there." Seen. 5, supra. This evidence, however, was more proba-
tive of falsity in ascribing any movement at all to the sound source than of 
falsity in describing the location of the movement. As we have pointed 
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On similar reasoning the District Court found Seligson's 
above-quoted explanation of the intended meaning of the sen-
tence incredible. · The District Court reasoned: 
"Thus, according to Seligson, the words used in the 
Article-'About the room'-mean something different to 
him than they do to the populace in general. If Seligson 
is to be believed, at the time of publication of the Article 
he interpreted, and he still interprets today, the words 
'about the room' to mean 'along the wall.' After careful 
consideration of Seligson's testimony and of his de-
meanor at trial, the Court finds that Seligson's testimony 
on this point is not credible. Seligson is an intelligent 
person whose knowledge of the English language cannot 
be questioned. It is simply impossible for the Court to 
believe that he interprets a commonplace word such as 
'about' to mean anything other than its plain ordinary 
meaning. 
"Based on the above finding that Seligson's testimony 
to the contrary is not credible, the Court further finds 
that at the time of the Article's publication Seligson 
knew that the words 'individual instruments ... tended 
to wander about the room' did not accurately describe 
the effects that he and Lefkow had heard during the 
'special listening test.' Consequently, the Court con-
cludes, on the basis of proof which it considers clear and 
convincing, that the plaintiff has sustained its burden of 
proving that the defendant published a false statement of 
material fact with the knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.'' 508 F. Supp., 
at 1276--1277. 
Notably, the District Court's ultimate determination of ac-
tual malice was framed as a conclusion and was stated in the 
disjunctive. Even though the District Court found it impos-
out, the District Court found that the article was truthful insofar as it 
stated that apparent movement occured. 
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sible to believe that Seligson-at the time of trial-was 
truthfully maintaining that the words "about the room" could 
fairly be read, in context, to describe lateral movement 
rather than irregular movement throughout the room, the 
District Court did not identify any independent evidence that 
Seligman realized the inaccuracy of the statement, or enter-
tained serious doubts about its truthfulness, at the time of 
publication. 14 
II 
This is a case in which two well settled and respected rules 
of law point in opposite directions. 
Petitioner correctly reminds us that Rule 52(a) provides: 
"Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly er-
roneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportu-
nity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the 
witnesses." 
We have repeatedly held that the rule means what it says. 
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 
U. S. 844, 855-856 (1982); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 
U. S. 273, 287 (1982); United States v. United States Gypsum 
Co., 333 U. S. 364, 394-396 (1948). It surely does not 
stretch the language of the rule to characterize an inquiry 
into what a person knew at a given point in time as a question 
of "fact." 15 In this case, since the trial judge expressly com-
mented on Seligson's credibility, petitioner argues that the 
Court of Appeals plainly erred when it refused to uphold the 
District Court's actual malice "finding" under the clearly er-
roneous standard of Rule 52(a). 
On the other hand, respondent correctly reminds us that in 
cases raising First Amendment issues we have repeatedly 
14 The District Court expressly rejected petitioner's exhaustive attempt 
to prove that Seligson had a continuing interest in marketing his own 
speaker and therefore deliberately distorted the review. 508 F. Supp., at 
1275. 
16 Indeed, in Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 170 (1979) we referred in 
passing to actual malice as "ultimate fact." 
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held that an appellate court has an obligation to "make an in-
dependent examination of the whole record" in order to make 
sure "that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden in-
trusion on the field of free expression." New York Times v. 
Sullivan, supra, 376 U. S., at 284-286. See also NAACP v. 
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U. S. 886, 93~934 (1983); Green-
belt Cooperative Publishing Assn. v. Bressler, 398 U. S. 6, 
11 (1970); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 732-733 
(1968). Although such statements have been made most fre-
quently in cases to which Rule 52(a) does not apply because 
they arose in state courts, respondent argues that the con-
stitutional principle is equally applicable to federal litigation. 
We quite agree; surely it would pervert the concept of feder-
alism for this Court to lay claim to a broader power of review 
over state court judgments than it exercises in reviewing the 
judgments of intermediate federal courts. 
Our standard of review must be faithful to both Rule 52(a) 
and the rule of independent review applied in New York 
Times v. Sullivan. The conflict between the two rules is in 
some respects more apparent than real. The New York 
Times rule emphasizes the need for an appellate court to 
make an independent examination of the entire record; Rule 
52(a) never forbids such an examination, and indeed our sem-
inal decision on the rule expressly contemplated a review of 
the entire record, stating that a "finding is 'clearly erroneous' 
when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing 
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed." United 
States v. Gypsum Co., supra, 333 U. S., at 395 (emphasis 
supplied). Moreover, Rule 52(a) commands that "due re-
gard" shall be given to the trial judge's opportunity to ob-
serve the demeanor of the witnesses; the constitutionally-
based rule of independent review permits this opportunity to 
be given its due. Indeed, as we previously observed, the 
Court of Appeals in this case expressly declined to second-
guess the district judge on the credibility of the witnesses. 
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The requirement that special deference be given to a trial 
judge's credibility determinations is itself a recognition of the 
broader proposition that the presumption of correctness that 
attaches to factual findings is stronger in some cases than in 
others. The same "clearly erroneous" standard applies to 
findings based on documentary evidence as to those based en-
tirely on oral testimony, see United States Gypsum Co., 
supra, 333 U. S., at 394, but the presumption has lesser force 
in the former situation than in the latter. Similarly, the 
standard does not change as the trial becomes longer and 
more complex, but the likelihood that the appellate court will 
rely on the presumption tends to increase when trial judges 
have lived with the controversy for weeks or months instead 
of just a few hours. 16 One might therefore assume that the 
cases in which the appellate courts have a duty to exercise 
independent review are merely those in which the presump-
tion that the trial court's ruling is correct is particularly 
weak. The difference between the two rules, however, is 
much more than a mere matter of degree. For the rule of 
independent review assigns to judges a constitutional respon-
sibility that cannot be delegated to the trier of fact, whether 
'
6 "The conclusiveness of a 'finding of fact' depends on the nature of the 
materials on which the finding is based. The finding even of a so-called 
'subsidiary fact' may be a more or less difficult process varying according to 
the simplicity or sublety of the type of 'fact' in controversy. Finding so-
called ultimate 'facts' more clearly implies the application of standards of 
law. And so the 'finding offact' even if made by two courts may go beyond 
the determination that should not be set aside here. Though labeled 'find-
ing of fact,' it may involve the very basis on which judgment of fallible evi-
dence is to be made. Thus, the conclusion that may appropriately be 
drawn from the whole mass of evidence is not always the ascertainment of 
the kind of 'fact' that precludes consideration by this Court. See, e. g., 
Beyer v. LeFevre, 186 U. S. 114. Particularly is this so where a decision 
here for review cannot escape broadly social judgments-judgments lying 
close to opinion regarding the whole nature of our Government and the du-
ties and immunities of citizenship." Baumgartner v. United States, 322 
U. S. 665, 670-671 (1944). See generally Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 
supra, 456 U. S., at 286-287 n. 16. 
' . 
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the factfinding function be performed in the particular case 
by a jury or by a trial judge. 
Rule 52(a) applies to findings of fact, including those de-
scribed as "ultimate facts" because they may determine the 
outcome of litigation. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 
supra, 456 U. S., at 287. But Rule 52(a) does not inhibit an 
appellate court's power to correct errors of law, including 
those that may infect a so-called mixed finding of law and 
fact, or a finding of fact that is predicated on a misunder-
standing of the governing rule of law. See ibid.; Inwood 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., supra, 456 
U. S., at 855 n. 15. Nor does Rule 52(a) "furnish particular 
guidance with respect to distinguishing law from fact." 
Pullman Standard v. Swint, supra, 456 U. S., at 288. 
What we have characterized as "the vexing nature" of that 
distinction, ibid., does not, however, diminish its importance, 
or the importance of the principles that require the distinc-
tion to be drawn in certain cases. 17 
In a consideration of the possible application of the distinc-
tion to the issue of "actual malice," at least three characteris-
tics of the rule enunciated in the New York Times case are 
relevant. First, the common law heritage of the rule itself 
assigns an especially broad role to the judge in applying it to 
specific factual situations. Second, the content of the rule is 
not revealed simply by its literal text, but rather is given 
meaning through the evolutionary process of common law ad-
judication; though the source of the rule is found in the Con-
17 A finding of fact in some cases is inseparable from the principles 
through which it was deduced. At some point, the reasoning by which a 
fact is "found" crosses the line between application of those ordinary princi-
ples of logic and common experience which are ordinarily entrusted to the 
finder of fact into the realm of a legal rule upon which the reviewing court 
must exercise its own independent judgment. Where the line is drawn 
varies according to the nature of the substantive law at issue. Regarding 
certain largely factual questions in some areas of the law, the stakes-in 
terms of impact on future cases and future conduct-are too great to en-
trust them finally to the judgment of the trier of fact. 
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stitution, it is nevertheless largely a judge-made rule of law. 
Finally, the constitutional values protected by the rule make 
it imperative that judges-and in some cases judges of this 
Court-make sure that it is correctly applied. A few words 
about each of these aspects of the rule are appropriate. 
The federal rule that prohibits a public official from recov-
ering damages for a defamatory falsehood unless he proves 
that the false "statement was made with 'actual malice'-that 
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disre-
gard of whether it was false or not," New York Times, supra, 
376 U. S., at 279-280, has its counterpart in rules previously 
adopted by a number of state courts and extensively re-
viewed by scholars for generations. 18 The earlier defamation 
cases, in turn, have a kinship to English cases considering the 
kind of motivation that must be proved to support a common 
law action for deceit. 19 It has long been recognized that the 
formulation of a rule of this kind "allows the judge the maxi-
mum of power in passing judgment in the particular case." 20 
Moreover, the exercise of this power is the process through 
which the rule itself evolves and its integrity is maintained. 21 
18 A representative list of such cases and comments is found in footnote 
20 of the Court's opinion in New York Times, supra, 376 U. S., at 280. 
19 Under what has been characterized as the "honest liar" formula, fraud 
could be proved "when it is shown that a false representation has been 
made (1) knowinging, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, 
careless whether it be true or false." Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337, 374 
(1889). 
20 "Probably the formula is less definite than it seems. Its limitations 
are perhaps largely a matter of language color. As do most English for-
mulas, it allows the judge the maximum of power in passing judgment in 
the particular case. It restricts the jury as neatly as can be done to the 
function of evaluating the evidence. But judgment under this formula can 
be turned either way with equal facility on any close case." L. Green, 
Judge and Jury, 286 (1930) (Chapter 10 of this work by Professor Green, 
cited herein, is also published in 16 Va. L. Rev. 749 (1930)). 
''"And it must be kept in mind that the judge has another distinct func-
tion in dealing with these elements, which though not frequently called into 
play, is of the utmost importance. It involves the determination of the 
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As we have explained, the meaning of some concepts cannot 
be adequately expressed in a simple statement: 
"These considerations fall short of proving St. Amant's 
reckless disregard for the accuracy of his statements 
about Thompson. 'Reckless disregard,' it is true, can-
not be fully encompassed in one infallible definition. In-
evitably its outer limits will be marked out through case-
by-case adjudication, as is true with so many legal 
standards for judging concrete cases, whether the stand-
ard is provided by the Constitution, statutes, or case 
law. Our cases, however, have furnished meaningful 
guidance for the further definition of a reckless publica-
tion." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 730-731 
(1968). 
When the standard governing the decision of a particular 
case is provided by the Constitution, this Court's role in 
marking out the limits of the standard through the process of 
case-by-case adjudication is of special importance. This 
process has been vitally important in cases involving restric-
tions on the freedom of speech protected by the First Amend-
ment, particularly in those cases in which it is contended that 
the communication in issue is within one of the few classes of 
"unprotected" speech. 
The First Amendment presupposes that the freedom to 
speak one's mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty-
and thus a good unto itself-but also is essential to the com-
mon quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole. 
Under our Constitution "there is no such thing as a false idea. 
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its 
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on 
scope of the general formula , or some one of its elements. It comes into 
play in marginal cases. It requires the judge to say what sort of conduct 
can be considered as condemned under the rules which are employed in 
such cases. It is the function through which the formulas and rules them-
selves were evolved, through which their integrity is maintained and their 
availability determined." L. Green, Judge and Jury, 304 (1930). 
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the competition of other ideas." Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., supra, 418 U. S., at 339-340 (footnote omitted). Nev-
ertheless, there are categories of communcation and certain 
special utterences to which the majestic protection of the 
First Amendment does not extend because they "are no es-
sential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight 
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be 
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social inter-
est in order and morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hamphire, 
315 u. s. 568, 572 (1942). 
Libelous speech has been held to constitute one such cate-
gory, see Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250 (1952); oth-
ers that have been held to be outside the scope of the freedom 
of speech are fighting words, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 U. S. 568 (1942), incitement to riot, Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969), obscenity, Roth v. United States, 
354 U. S. 476 (1957), and child pornography, New York v. 
Ferber, 458 U. S. 747 (1982). 22 In each of these areas, the 
22 Commercial speech was once regarded as unprotected by the First 
Amendment, see Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52 (1942), but in Vir-
ginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 
748 (1976), we rejected that broad conclusion. Though false and mislead-
ing commercial speech could be deemed to represent a category of unpro-
tected speech, see ibid., the rationale for doing so would be essentially the 
same as that involved in the libel area, viz. "[T]here is no constitutional 
value in false statements of fact." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S., 
at 340. Moreover, since a commercial advertiser usually "seeks to dissem-
inate information about a specific prduct or service he himself provides and 
presumably knows more about than anyone else," Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, supra, 425 U. S., at 772 n. 24, 
there is a mininal "danger that governmental regulation of false or mislead-
ing price or product advertising will chill accurate and nondeceptive com-
mercial expression." Id., at 777 (Stewart, J . concurring). 
Statements made by public employees in their employment capacity and 
not touching on matters of public concern may be considered unprotected 
in the sense that employment-related sanctions may be imposed on the 
basis of such statements. See Connick v. Myers, -- U. S. -- (1983); 
Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated Schood District, 439 U. S. 410 
(1979); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563 (1968). 
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limits of the unprotected category, as well as the unprotected 
character of particular communications, has been determined 
by the judicial evaluation of special facts that have been 
deemed to have constitutional significance. In such cases, 
the Court has regularly conducted an independent review of 
the record both to be sure that the speech in question actually 
falls within the unprotected category and to confine the pe-
rimeters of any unprotected category within acceptably nar-
row limits in an effort to ensure that protected expression 
will not be inhibited. Providing triers of fact with a general 
description of the type of communication whose content is un-
worthy of protection has not, in and of itself, served suffi-
ciently to narrow the category, nor served to eliminate the 
danger that decisions by triers of fact may inhibit the expres-
sion of protected ideas. 23 The principle of viewpoint neutral-
ity that underlies the First Amendment itself, see Police De-
partment of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 95-96 (1972), 
also imposes a special responsibility on judges whenever it is 
claimed that a particular communciation is unprotected. See 
generally, Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 4 (1949). 
We have exercised independent judgment on the question 
whether particular remarks "were so inherently inflamma-
tory as to come within that small class of 'fighting words' 
which are 'likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, 
and thereby cause a breach of the peace;'" Street v. New 
York, 394 U. S. 576, 592 (1969), and on the analogous ques-
tion whether advocacy is directed to inciting or producing im-
minent lawless action, Hess v. Indiana, 414 U. S. 105, 
108-109 (1973) (per curiam); compare id., at 111 (REHN-
QUIST, J., dissenting) ("The simple explanation for the result 
in this case is that the majority has interpreted the evidence 
23 The risk of broadening a category of unprotected speech may explain 
why one Member of this Court preferred a candid statement-"! know it 
when I see it,"-of his concept of the judicial function to a premature at-
tempt to fashion an all encompassing "shorthand description" of obscenity. 
See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J ., concurring). 
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differently from the courts below."); Edwards v. South Caro-
lina, 372 U. S. 229 (1963) (recognizing duty "to make an inde-
pendent examination of the whole record."); Pennekamp v. 
Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 335 (1946) ("[W]e are compelled to ex-
amine for ourselves the statements in issue to see whether or 
not they do carry a threat of clear and present danger ... or 
whether they are of a character which the principles of the 
First Amendment . . . protect."). 24 
Similarly, although under Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 
15 (1973), the questions of what appeals to "prurient interest" 
and what is "patently offensive" under the community stand-
ard obscenity test are "essentially questions of fact," id., at 
30, we expressly recognized the "ultimate power of appel-
late courts to conduct an independent review of constitutional 
claims when necessary," id., at 25. 25 We have therefore re-
24 See also Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380, 385-387 (1927) (explaining 
that this Court will review findings of fact by a State court where a federal 
right has been denied on the basis of a fact without evidence to support it 
and where a conclusion of law as to a federal right and a finding of fact are 
so intermingled to require analysis of the facts); Gitlow v. New York, 268 
U. S. 652, 665--666 (1925); see also Schaefer v. United States, 251 U. S. 
466, 483 (1920) (Brandeis, J. , dissenting); see generally Broadrick v. Okla-
homa, 413 U. S. 601, 613-Q14 (1973) (explaining Edwards v. South Caro-
lina, 372 U. S. 229 (1963); Cox v. Louisinana, 372 U. S. 536 (1963); and 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 311 (1940)). 
25 In support of this statement, we cited Justice Harlan's opinion in Roth 
v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 497-498 (1957), where he observed: 
"The Court seems to assume that 'obscenity' is a peculiar genus of 'speech 
and press,' which is as distinct, recognizable, and classifiable as poison ivy 
is among other plants. On this basis the constitutional question before us 
simply becomes whether 'obscenity,' as an abstraction, is protected by the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments, and the question whether a particular 
book may be suppressed becomes a mere matter of classification, of 'fact,' 
to be entrusted to a factfinder and insulated from independent constitu-
tional judgment. But surely the problem cannot be solved in such a gen-
eralized fashion. Every communication has an individuality and 'value' of 
its own. The suppression of a particular writing or other tangible form of 
expression is, therefore, an individual matter, and in the nature of things 
every such suppression raises an individual constitutional problem, in 
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jected the contention that a jury finding of obscenity vel non 
is insulated from review so long as the jury was properly in-
structed and there is some evidence to support its findings, 
holding that substantive constitutional limitations govern. 
In Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U. S. 153, 159-161 (1974), based 
on an independent examination of the evidence-the exhi-
bition of a motion picture-the Court held that the film in 
question "could not, as a matter of constitutional law, be 
found to depict sexual conduct in a patently offensive 
way .... " ld., at 161. 26 And in its recent opinion identifying 
a new category of unprotected expression-child pornogra-
phy-the Court expressly anticipated that an "independent 
examination" of the allegedly unprotected material may be 
necessary "to assure ourselves that the judgment ... 'does 
not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free ex-
pression."' New York v. Ferber, supra, 458 U. S., at 774 n. 
28 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U. S., 
at 285). 
which a reviewing court must determine for itself whether the attacked ex-
pression is suppressable within constitutional standards. Since those 
standards do not readily lend themselves to generalized definitions, the 
constitutional problem in the last analysis becomes one of particularized 
judgments which appellate courts must make for themselves. 
"I do nof think that reviewing courts can escape this responsibility by 
saying that the trier of facts, be it a jury or a judge, has labeled the ques-
tioned matter as 'obscene,' for, if 'obscenity' is to be suppressed, the ques-
tion whether a particular work is of that character involves not really an 
issue of fact but a question of constitutional judgment of the most sensitive 
and delicate kind." 
26 Compare Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 100, 124 (1974) 
(holding that jury determination of obscenity was supported by the evi-
dence and consistent with the applicable constitutional standard while re-
viewing petitioner's sufficiency of the evidence arguments regarding other 
issues under the test of Glasser v. United States, 418 U. S. 124 (1942)). See 
generally Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 187-190 (opinion of 
BRENNAN, J.) (de novo review required in obscenity cases); id., at 202-203 
(Warren, C. J., dissenting) (intermediate standard of review). 
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Hence, in New York Times v. Sullivan, after announcing 
the constitutional requirement for a finding of "actual malice" 
in certain types of defamation actions, it was only natural 
that we should conduct an independent review of the evi-
dence on the dispositive constitutional issue. We explained 
our action as follows: 
"This Court's duty is not limited to the elaboration of 
constitutional principles; we must also in proper cases re-
view the evidence to make certain that those principles 
have been constitutionally applied. This is such a case, 
particularly since the question is one of alleged trespass 
across 'the line between speech unconditionally guaran-
teed and speech which may legitimately be regulated.' 
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 525. In cases where 
that line must be drawn, the rule is that we 'examine for 
ourselves the statements in issue and the circumstances 
under which they were made to see . . . whether they 
are of a character which the principles of the First 
Amendment, as adopted by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, protect.' Pennekamp v. 
Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 335; see also One, Inc. v. Olesen, 
355 U. S. 371; Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 
U. S. 372. We must 'make an independent examination 
of the whole record,' Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 
U. S. 229, 235, so as to assure ourselves that the judg-
ment does not constitute a forbidden instrusion on the 
field of free expression." New York Times v. Sullivan, 
supra, 376 U. S., at 285 (footnote omitted). 27 
27 This Court "has an 'obligation to test challenged judgments against the 
guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments,' and in doing so 'this 
Court cannot avoid making an independent constitutional judgment on the 
facts of the case.' Jacabellis v. Ohio 378 U. S. 184, 190 (1964) [opinion of 
BRENNAN, J.]. The simple fact is that First Amendment questions of 
'constitutional fact' compel this Court's de novo review. See Edwards v. 
South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, 235 (1963); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 
U. S. 199, 205 n. 5 (1960).'' Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U. S. 29, 54 
(1971) (opinion of BRENNAN, J., joined by BURGER, C. J., and 
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In Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U. S. 279 (1971), a case in which 
the federal District Court had entered a directed verdict, we 
again conducted an independent examination of the evidence 
on the question of actual malice, labeling our definition of "ac-
tual malice" as a "constitutional rule" and stating that the 
question before us was whether that rule had been correctly 
applied to the facts of the case, id., at 284. Again we stated 
that independent inquiries "of this kind are familiar under the 
settled principle that '[i]n cases in which there is a claim of 
denial of rights under the Federal Constitution, this Court is 
not bound by the conclusions of lower courts, but will re-ex-
amine the evidentiary basis on which those conclusions are 
founded,'" noting that "in cases involving the area of tension 
between the First and Fourteenth Amendments on the one 
hand and state defamation laws on the other, we have fre-
quently had occasion to review 'the evidence in the . . . 
record to determine whether it could constitutionally support 
a judgment' for the plaintiff." Ibid. (citations omitted) 28 
BLACKMUN, J.). See generally Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 600 I 
(1917) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Ex facto jus oritur. That ancient rule 
must prevail in order that we may have a system of living law."). 
In New York Times v. Sullivan, we were reviewing a state court judg-
ment entered on a jury verdict. Respondent had contended that the Sev-
enth Amendment precluded an independent review. Recognizing that the 
Seventh Amendment's ban on re-examination of facts tried by a jury ap-
plied to a case coming from the state courts, Chicago, Burlington and 
Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 243-246 (1897); The Justices v. 
Murray, 9 Wall. 274 (1869); see generally Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 431 
(1830), we found the argument without merit, relying on our statement in 
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380, 385-386 (1927) that review of findings of 
fact is appropriate "where a conclusion of law as to a Federal right and a 
finding of fact are so intermingled as to make it necessary, in order to pass 
upon the Federal question, to analyze the facts." 
Z!lJustice Harlan, the lone dissenter in Time, Inc. v. Pape, observed that 
the Court had merely refound the facts in the case, but agreed that the 
Court was free to examine for itself the evidentiary bases upon which the 
decision below rested. He argued that this power need not be exercised in 
every case, but rather independent review of the evidence should be lim-
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In Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265, 277 (1971) 
the Court held "as a matter of constitutional law" that the 
jury could not be allowed to determine the relevance of a 
defamatory statement to the plaintiff's status as a public fig-
ure. We explained that the jury's application of such a 
standard "is unlikely to be neutral with respect to the content 
of speech and holds a real danger of becoming an instrument 
for the suppression of those 'vehement, caustic, and some-
times unpleasantly sharp attacks,' New York Times, supra, 
at 270, which must be protected if the guarantees of the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments are to prevail." Ibid. 29 
The requirement of independent appellate review reit-
erated in New York Times v. Sullivan is a rule of federal con-
stitutional law. It emerged from the exigency of deciding 
concrete cases; it is law in its purest form under our common 
law heritage. It reflects a deeply held conviction that 
judges-and particularly members of this Court-must exer-
cise such review in order to preserve the precious liberties 
established and ordained by the Constitution. The question 
whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is of 
the convincing clarity required to strip the utterance of First 
Amendment protection is not merely a question for the trier 
of fact. Judges, as expositors of the Constitution, must in-
dependently decide whether the evidence in the record is suf-
ficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the en-
try of any judgment that is not supported by clear and 
convincing proof of "actual malice." 
ited to cases in which certain "unusual factors" exist, such as "allegations of 
harrassment." 401 U. S., at 294. 
29 A similar concern with the need to "preserve the right of free speech 
both from suppression by tyrannous, well-meaning majorities and from 
abuse by irresponsible, fanatical minorities," Schaefer v. United States, 
251 U. S., at 482 (1920) (dissenting opinion) was identified by Justice Bran-
deis in explaining the special risk in allowing jurors to evaluate the charac-
ter of the "clear and present danger" presented by arguably seditious 
speech. 
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III 
The Court of Appeals was correct in its conclusions (1) that 
there is a significant difference between proof of actual mal-
ice 30 and mere proof of falsity, and (2) that such additional 
proof is lacking in this case. 
The factual portion of the District Court's opinion may 
fairly be read as including the following findings: (1) 
Seligson's actual perception of the apparent movement of the 
sound source at the time the Bose 901 was tested was "along 
the wall" rather than "about the room"; (2) even when the 
words in the disputed sentence are read in the context of the 
entire article, neither the "average reader," nor any other 
intelligent person, would interpret the word "about" to mean 
"across"~ (3) Seligson is an intelligent, well educated person; 
(4) the words "about the room" have the same meaning for 
Seligson as they do for the populace in general; and (5) al-
though he was otherwise a credible witness, Seligson's testi-
mony that (a) he did not "know what made me pick that par-
ticular choice of words" and (b) that the word "about" meant 
what he had drawn on the board, is not credible. 
When the testimony of a witness is not believed, the trier 
of fact may simply disregard it. Normally the discredited 
testimony is not considered a sufficient basis for drawing a 
contrary conclusion. See Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Rail-
way Co., 340 U. S. 573, 575 (1951). In this case the trial 
judge found it impossible to believe that Seligson continued 
to maintain that the word "about" meant "across." 
Seligson's testimony does not rebut any inference of actual 
malice that the record otherwise supports, but it is equally 
80 The burden of proving "actual malice" requires the plaintiff to demon-
strate with clear and convincing evidence that the defendant realized that 
his statement was false or that he subjectively entertained serious doubt as 
to the truth of his statement. See, e. g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 
supra, 376 U. S., at 280; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, supra, 418 U. S., 
at 342; St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 731 (1968); see generally 
W. Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts 771-772, 821 (4th ed. 1971). 
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clear that it does not constitute clear and convincing evidence 
of actual malice. Seligson displayed a capacity for ratio-
nalization. He had made a mistake and when confronted 
with it, he refused to admit it and steadfastly attempted to 
maintain that no mistake had been made-that the inaccurate 
was accurate. That attempt failed, but the fact that he made 
the attempt does not establish that he realized the 
innaccuracy at the time of publication. 
Aside from Seligson's vain attempt to defend his statement 
as a precise description of the nature of the sound movement, 
the only evidence of actual malice on which the District Court 
relied was the fact that the statement was an inaccurate de-
scription of what Seligson had actually perceived. Seligson 
of course had insisted "I know what I heard." The trial 
court took him at his word, and reasoned that since he did 
know what he had heard, and he knew that the meaning of 
the language employed did not accurately reflect what he 
heard, he must have realized the statement was inaccurate at 
the time he wrote it. "Analysis of this kind may be adequate 
when the alleged libel purports to be an eyewitness or other 
direct account of events that speak for themselves." Time, 
Inc. v. Pape, supra, 401 U. S., at 279. See generally The 
Santissima Tinidad, 7 wheat. 283, 338-339 (1822). Here, 
however, adoption of the language chosen was "one of a num-
ber of possible rational interpretations" of an event "that 
bristled with ambiquities" and descriptive challenges for the 
writer. Time, Inc. v. Pape, supra, 401 U. S., at 290. The 
choice of such language, though reflecting a misconception, 
does not place the speech beyond the outer limits of the First 
Amendment's broad protective umbrella. Under the Dis-
trict Court's analysis, any individual using a malapropism 
might be liable, simply because an intelligent speaker would 
have to know that the term was inaccurate in context, even 
though he did not realize his folly at the time. 
The statement in this case represents the sort of inaccu-
racy that is commonplace in the forum of robust debate to 
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which the New York Times rule applies. I d., at 292. "Re-
alistically, . . . some error is inevitable; and the difficulties of 
separating fact from fiction convinced the Court in New York 
Times, Butts, Gertz, and similiar cases to limit liability to in-
stances where some degree of culpability is present in order 
to eliminate the risk of undue self-censorship and the sup-
pression of truthful material." Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 
153, 171-172 (1979). "[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in 
free debate, and ... must be protected if the freedoms of ex-
pression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . . 
to survive.'" New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, 376 
U. S., at 271-272 (citation omitted). 
The Court of Appeals entertained some doubt concerning 
the ruling that the New York Times rule should be applied to 
a claim of product disparagement based on a critical review of 
a loudspeaker system. We express no view on that ruling, 
but having accepted it for purposes of deciding this case, we 
agree with the Court of Appeals that the difference between 
hearing violin sounds move around the room and hearing 
them wander back and forth fits easily within the breathing 
space that gives life to the First Amendment. We may ac-
cept all of the purely factual findings of the District Court and 
nevertheless hold as a matter of law that the record does not 
contain clear and convincing evidence that Seligson or his em-
ployer prepared the loudspeaker article with knowledge that 
it contained a false statement, or with reckless disregard of 
the truth. 
It may well be that in this case, the "finding" of the District 
Court on the actual malice question could have been set aside 
under the clearly erroneous standard of review, and we share 
the concern of the Court of Appeals that the statements at 
issue tread the line between fact and opinion. Moreover, the 
analysis of the central legal question before us may seem out 
of place in a case involving a dispute about the sound quality 
of a loudspeaker. But though the question presented 
reaches us on a somewhat peculiar wavelength, we reaffirm 
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the principle of independent appellate review that we have 
applied uncounted times before. We hold that the clearly er-
roneous standard of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure does not prescribe the standard of review to be ap-
plied in reviewing a determination of actual malice in a case 
governed by New York Times v. Sullivan. 31 Appellate 
judges in such a case must exercise independent judgment 
and determine whether the record establishes actual malice 
with convincing clarity. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
31 There are, of course, many findings of fact in a defamation case that 
are irrelevant to the constitutional standard of New York Times v. Sulli-
van and to which the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) is fully appli-
cable. Indeed, it is not actually necessary to review the "entire" record 
to fulfill the function of independent appellate review on the actual malice 
question; rather, only those portions of the record which relate to the ac-
tual malice determination must be independently assessed. The independ-
ent review function is not equivalent to a "de novo" review of the ultimate 
judgment itself, in which a reviewing court makes an original appraisal of 
all the evidence to decide whether or not it believes that judgment should 
be entered for plaintiff. If the reviewing Court determines that actual 
malice has been established with convincing clarity, the judgment of the 
trial court may only be reversed on the ground of some other error of law 
or clearly erroneous finding of fact. Although the Court of Appeals stated 
that it must perform a de novo review, it is plain that the Court of Appeals 
did not overturn any factual finding to which Rule 52(a) would be appli-
cable, but instead engaged in an independent assessment only of the evi-
dence germane to the actual malice determination. 
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After reading the dissent, my views are now clarified 




Copies to the Conference 
CHAMI!!I!:RS OF" 
•n:pr~nu Clf~turl ~tf tlf~:.mub j)tat~• 
JluJringhtn. ~. elf. 21lp'l~ 
..JUSTICE ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
April 18, 1984 
Re: 82-1246 - Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union 
Dear Bill: 
In response to your dissent, I will make the 
following addition to footnote 27 on page 23 of my 
circulating draft: 
The intermingling of law and fact in the 
actual malice cetermination is no greater in state 
or federal jury trials than in federal bench 
trials. See supra at 13, and infra at 26-27. 
And, of course, the limitation on appellate review 
of factual determinations under Rule 52(a) is no 
more stringent than the limitation on federal 
appellate review of a jury's factual 
determinations under the Seventh Amendment, which 
commands that "no fact tried by jury, shall be 
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United 
States, than according to the rules of the common 
law." 
It seems to me that the logic of the argument you 
make requires overruling not only Time, Inc. v. Pape 
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CHAI-<BERS OF" 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.:§iu:punu <!Jourt of tqt ~ttitt~ ~taftg 
'Jiiaglyhtgfon. !9. <.!f. 2ll~'l~ 
Re: No. 82-1246 - Bose Corporation v. 
April 23, 1984 
Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. 
Dear John: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
ilUFtuU <qonrt .n tJr~ ~b •ta.tts 
JruJringhtn. ~· elf. 20,?'4-~ 
CHAM!IERS 01" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE April 26, 1984 
82-1246 - Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union 
Dear John: 
The dissent has given me a good deal of trouble and 
I conclude that I will join only in the judgment. 
Justice Stevens 
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November 11, 1983 
No. 82-1246 - Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Further consideration, particularly on the points Lewis made 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Monday, November 14, 1983 THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 
Close judicial scrutiny of actual-malice verdicts 
at all court levels is absolutely vital if the 
Sullivan rule is to provide the First Amendment 
protection intended by the court in that case. 
Continued from preceding page 
not ruled on the applicability of Sul-
livan to a product-disparagement 
claim, the court reached its conclusion 
on the basis of other court decisions 
and an analysis of the interests served 
by the free flow of information about 
consumer products, on the one hand, 
and the protection of the reputation of 
a manufacturer's product, on the 
other. 
The holding that the conditional 
First Amendment privilege as 
recognized in Sullivan is available in 
product-disparagement cases brought 
by corporations seems to be consis-
tent, and perhaps even required by, re-
cent Supreme Court decisions holding 
that commercial speech is entitled to 
First Amendment protection.19 This 
holding could be extremely significant 
in bringing product-disp11ragement 
cases -into the mainstream of libel ac-
tions, and it has not been challenged 
before the 1st Circuit or the Supreme 
Court. 20 
More importantly, on close analysis 
Bose raises a sobering example of just 
how vulnerable our most respected 
publications are becoming to libel 
litigation and libel judgments. Keep in 
mind that the defendant in Bose was 
not a sensationalist tabloid like the 
National Enquirer and not even a news-
paper with muckraking investigative 
reporting like the Washington Post. 
Rather it was th«;_ highly respected, 
and staid, Consumer Reports. 
Also keep in mind that the dis-
paragement that was the basis of a six-
figure verdict was not a diatribe 
against a product or a malicious as-
sault on it. (Bose tried to present the 
a rticle in that light, but the trial court 
totally rejected those efforts.) Rather, 
liability was based on the trial court's 
decision that the engineer who wrote 
the review was imprecise in his selec-
tion of three words, and on its belief 
FTC Rule 
Continued from page 4 
said : "A compensated expert witness 
normally already has a financial in-
terest in the litigation," one the FTC 
believes won't be significantly in,· 
creased if the expert also cross-
examines. 
The agency expressed confidence 
that lawyers who appear before it will 
be able to make "sensible judgments" 
about when their clients will be best 
served by cross-examination con-
ducted by a non-lawyer. 
And many lawyers welcome that 
opportunity to let non-lawyers cross-
examine. "I'm not sure it's already not 
the law," says William H. Allen of 
Washington's Covington & Burling, 
who has an administrative law prac-
tice. "If the party thinks it will help 
him, what's wrong with it?" 
Dean Ernest Gellhorn of Case 
Western Reserve University School of 
Law agrees. "I see no reason lawyers 
have to have a monopoly on every 
asnect of the administrative orocess." 
that he was knowingly , imprecise, 
based solely on the court's disbelief ot 
his testimony. Imposing liability on 
that basis allows virtually a zero 
margin for error in commentary by 
the press. 
In Sullivan, the Supreme Court held 
that the First Amendment precludes a 
rule of liability based on falsity alone 
because that rule "dampens the vigor 
and limits the variety of public 
debate. " 21 If the Supreme Court orders 
reinstatement of the trial court's judg· 
ment, as Bose requests, the court will 
have taken a giant step backward 
toward endorsing that rule. 
(1) 508 F . Supp. 1249 (D. Mass. 1980), rev'd, 692 
F, 2d 189 (1st Clr. 1982), cert. granted,- U.S.-, 
102 S. Ct. 1872 (1983). 
(2) 403 u.s. 29 (1971). 
(3) 401 u.s. 279 (1971). 
( 4) 401 u.s. 265 (1971) . 
(5) 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
(6) 376 U.S. at 285, quoting "Edwards v. South 
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229,, 235 (1963). 
(7) See, e.g., Nat'! Assoc. of Letter Carriers v. 
Austin, 418 U .S. 264, 282 (1974); Greenbelt Coop. 
Pub. Assoc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); Picker· 
ing v. Bd, of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); St. 
Amant v . Thompson, 390 U .S. 727 (1968). 
(8) 508 F. Supp. at 1252·54. 
(9) Id. at 1260·67. 
(10) Id . at 1267·69. 
(11) Id. at 1277. 
(12) 529 F . Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1981). 
(13) 692 F .2d 197. 
(14) Id. at 195. 
(15) See n . 7, supra. 
(16) Libel Defense Resource Center Bulletin, 
No.6, at 2 (Winter 1983). 
(17) Libel Defense Resource Center Bulletin, 
No.1, at 21 (Spring-Summer 1983) . 
(18) Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 567 F. 
Supp. 651 (D.D.C. 1983). 
(19) See, e .g., In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); 
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm ., 447 U .S. 557 (1980); Bates v. State Bar of 
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia Pharmacy 
Bd. v . Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 
u.s. 748 (1976) . 
(20) On Bose's appeal to the 1st Circuit, a con-
curring judge emphasized that the 1st Circuit was 
not passing on the District Court's finding that 
Bose was a public figure . 692 F . 2d at 197. 
(21) 376 U .S. at 279. 
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